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THE PRIVATE LAW TREATMENT OF
DEFECTIVE PRODUCTS IN SALES SITUATIONS
ALAN SCHWARTZt
The parties to every sale face risks because the goods may be noncon-
forming. Courts and codifiers have pursued three goals in connection
with these risks of nonconformity: (1) to allow private choice by per-
mitting parties, under both warranty and tort law, to bargain as to who
will bear them; (2) to prevent buyers from bearing concentrated losses
from defective goods by allocating risks to the parties believed best able to
spread those losses; and, (3) to prevent defects from occurring by allo-
cating risks so as to improve product quality. These goals have been
pursued by initially placing risks of nonconformity on sellers, but allow-
ing sellers, subject to judicial control, to shift them to buyers by contract.'
The relationship between these goals has long been confused;
consequently so too has been the manner in which risks of nonconformity
have been imposed. Recently, however, a consensus is emerg-
ing that the first goal is inconsistent with the others. If, for example, a
court enforces a disclaimer, thereby pursuing the goal of allowing the
parties to bargain, losses from a defect may be concentrated on the buyer,
thereby violating the second goal of dispersing losses. Courts now fre-
quently resolve this apparent inconsistency by pursuing the latter two
goals, of avoiding concentrated losses and improving product quality, and
ignoring the former. As Justice Traynor held:
Since Maywood Bell is strictly liable in tort, the fact that it re-
stricted its contractual liability to Vandermark is immaterial.
t Associate Professor of Law, Indiana University. I wish to thank Harry Pratter,
Julius Getman, Jon Hirschoff, Roger Dworkin, Morris Arnold, Philip Thorpe and
Douglass Boshkoff for their helpful comments on earlier drafts. The errors which re-
main are mine.
1. The UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE provides that all merchant sellers make a "war-
ranty of merchantability" in connection with the goods sold, which in effect imposes
most risks of defects on them, but it allows sellers to disclaim that warranty or limit
the remedies arising from its breach. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 2-314, -316,
-719. Although tort law imposes risks more absolutely than sales law, sellers may never-
theless disclaim liability for negligence in manufacturing. E.g., Southwest Forest In-
dus., Inc. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 422 F.2d 1013 (9th Cir. 1970) ; Neville Chem.
Co. v. Union Carbide Corp., 422 F.2d 1205 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 826
(1970). Furthermore, buyers may assume the risk of "unreasonably dangerous" prod-
ucts which the RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) otherwise imposes on
manufacturers. E.g. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 102, at 671 (4th
ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER].
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Regardless of the obligations it assumed by contract, it is sub-
ject to strict liability in tort because it is in the business of
selling automobiles, one of wthich proved to be defective and
caused injury to human beings.2
This article will consider whether a better resolution of the potential
conflicts among the goals the courts have pursued can be achieved than
Justice Traynor's solution of abandoning one goal in favor of the other
two. Justice Traynor's result is initially surprising because the courts'
goals are theoretically complementary. Buyers left free to choose will pay
sellers or others to bear risks when the price these parties charge for bear-
ing them is lower than the cost to a buyer of bearing or avoiding them
himself; such transactions reduce loss concentrations. Buyers, moreover,
will tend not to select products whose risks of nonconformity are high be-
cause bearing, avoiding and shifting risks all cost money. "High risk
sellers" may be forced, by the loss of business, to improve their goods;
there will then be fewer losses attributable to defects. An informed pur-
suit of private law goals therefore apparently requires courts only to en-
force the bargains the parties reach.
This solution, however, is unsatisfactory because it ignores what I
call the information problem. The first goal, that of protecting bargains,
should be pursued only if buyers are able to make rational choices
whether to bear or shift risks. This they can do only if they are informed
as to the costs of bearing risks, avoiding risks by their own efforts and
shifting them to others. In addition, uninformed buyers may mistakenly
bear risks which they would otherwise shift had they known the costs
involved, and may mistakenly take no steps to avoid those risks they do
bear, with the result that excessive losses may be concentrated on them.
And buyers without information may be unable to differentiate between
high and low risk goods, thereby buying too many of the former;
this results in insufficient improvement in product quality. Economic
theory, moreover, indicates that the requisite information is unlikely to be
forthcoming in the necessary amounts, since information is what econo-
mists call a public good and will thus probably be underproduced by the
private sector. Some buyers may also perceive the cost of adequately
informing themselves about their transactions to be higher than the gains,
and may therefore not absorb information even if it is made available.
One solution to the information problem is to impose risks of noncon-
2. Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal.2d 256, 263, 391 P.2d 168, 172, 37 Cal.
Rptr. 896, 900 (1964).
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formity on sellers, who presumably possess more information about what
they sell than do buyers. This is to abandon the goal of protecting bar-
gains, but it forces uninformed buyers to "insure" with their sellers, there-
by reducing loss concentrations. It also forces buyers to take the cost of
risks of nonconformity into account when making purchases, thereby pos-
sibly reducing those risks. As indicated above, this is the solution many
courts are adopting, either openly by embracing strict liability in tort,3
or covertly by manipulating factual matters so that buyers are shown to
have "expected" their sellers to bear risks.' The alternative solution is
to provide buyers with information.5 Courts, however, are ill-suited
to this task because they are unable to gather information and make it
available to buyers prior to purchase.
Nevertheless, I argue that providing information, whether adminis-
tratively or by legislation requiring sellers to disclose it, is the preferable
solution. Once the information problem is resolved, the law's goals are in
fact complementary. Moreover, informed bargains are more effective
than risk impositions in achieving the goals of reducing loss concentrations
and improving product quality, and pursuit of these goals through bar-
gains allows the parties greater freedom.6 Should a policy of providing
information be implemented, it then follows that courts should neutrally
enforce bargains, for by doing so all of the law's goals will be achieved.
This thesis is set out in Part I, in which I examine each goal separ-
ately and ask how it can best be realized. I next consider the relationship
among these goals, discuss the relevant value choices involved in resolv-
ing the information problem and, finally, analyze the difficulty, and neces-
3. E.g. Cunningham v. MacNeal Memorial Hospital, 47 Ill. 2d 443, 266 N.E.2d 897
(1971).
4. Cf. text accompanying notes 46-70 infra.
5. The implied textual approval of judicial risk impositions should not be over-
stated. Initially, the adoption of strict liability in tort is questionable because the UCC
already treats the problem. See Titus, Sectio= 402 A of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts and the Uniform Commnercial Code, 22 STAN. L. REv. 713 (1970) [hereinafter cited
as Titus]. Also, courts have difficulty identifying information gaps and sometimes im-
pose risks improperly. See discussion of Wilson Trading beginning at note 30 infra. Fi-
nally, some courts are unjustifiably imposing risks for reasons that have nothing to do
with a lack of information. See text accompanying note 80 infra. My point here is only
that when information gaps exist that no other societal institution is acting to fill, judi-
cial risk impositions, other things being equal, are preferable to nothing.
6. This article considers the possibilities of imposing risks on sellers or providing
information and allowing bargains. Risks could also be imposed on buyers. This choice
is not discussed because when buyers are sufficiently informed to bargain with respect to
risks, their sellers are also likely to be or can be made to be. Thus, the law's proper
role is neutrality; put another way, the situations in which buyers are informed and
sellers are not or cannot be informed seem too uncommon to warrant concern. Should
the reader differ with this perception, the analysis above can easily be applied to the
informed buyer/uninformed seller case.
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sity, of neutrally enforcing bargains. Part II applies the analysis to three
significant problems with which warranty and tort have coped, such as
the question of unequal bargaining power. My aim is to show that better
solutions than those the courts have devised are available, and that the
courts have erred primarily because they are insufficiently informed as to
the contributions and limitations of the market in achieving the goals they
seek. Part III demonstrates the inadequacy of the Uniform Commercial
Code's' treatment of defective products problems-an inadequacy
which also stems largely from an insufficient awareness of the market.
My conclusion, briefly put, is that bargaining will adequately resolve
defective products problems if information gaps are eliminated.8
I. THE LAw's GOALS
Protecting Bargains9
The courts allow bargains on the premises that people can best
achieve their aims when freely acting as individuals, and that there is
positive value in letting people do as they wish. People, however, can
competently achieve their goals only if they can make rational decisions
with respect to those goals, that is to say, only if they possess the ability
to choose means likely to achieve ends. Rational decisions require in-
formation. To decide whether private ordering is desirable in an area,
such as the allocation of risks of nonconformity, we must therefore ascer-
tain whether there is a gap between what parties need to know and
what they are likely to know.
7. UNIFORM CO MERCIAL CODE [hereinafter referred to as UCC or Code].
8. The problems this article treats may also be approached by having the state
regulate the ways in which products may be made. A recent and potentially significant
effort to do this is the Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 2051-81 (Supp.
1973), Pub. L. No. 92-573, 86 Stat. 1207 (1972), which creates an administrative agency
authorized to establish safety standards for products produced for consumers and to ban
unalterably unsafe products. See id. §§ 2053, 2056, 2057. Earlier Federal Statutes regu-
lating product quality, such as the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§
301-92 (1970), are interestingly described in P. KEETON & M. SHAI'o, PRODUCTS AND THE
CONSUMER: DEFECTIVE AND DANGEROUS PRODUCTS (1970). Efforts such as these, where
the state specifies how goods are produced, are beyond the scope of this article; its sub-
ject is the utility of risk allocations in achieving the goals both public and private law
share. Nevertheless, to the extent that this article demonstrates the efficacy of market
solutions to defective products problems, it is an argument against doing things otherwise.
9. What I describe as the goal of protecting bargains is often referred to in sales
law as the policy of protecting buyer expectations which the transaction engendered.
See, e.g., R. NoRDSTRom, HAND3OOK OF THE LAW OF SALES §§ 76, 81, 86, 88 (1970);
Boshkoff, Some Thoughts About Physical Harm, Disclaimers and Warranties, 4 B.C.
IND. & Com. L. REv. 285 (1963) ; Honnold, A Uniform Law For Intentational Sales, 107
U. PA. L. REv. 299, 313-15 (1959). Similarly, the policy of bargain protection has been
framed as protecting buyer reliance on representations sellers either explicitly or im-
plicitly make about the transaction. See, e.g., McClain, Implied Warranties in Sales, 7
HArv. L. REV. 213, 220 (1893) ; Prosser, The Implied Warranty of Merchantable Qual-
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Assume a product with one moving part which can become defective
only if that part breaks. Let p equal the probability that the part will
break, and C equal the cost of the damage a defect will cause. The value
of the risk of nonconformity, R, will then be pC.'10 Assume further that
the seller agrees to bear R, and charges a price, X, for doing so. X will
be the cost which bearing the risk entails, which in turn will be either R's
value or the cost to the seller of avoiding it, A(s), whichever is less.1
A buyer must decide whether to pay the seller X for bearing the risk, to
bear it himself or to avoid it through his own efforts, A(b). To make
this choice, he must be able to value X, R and A (b).
For example, assume that R is $16, that A(b) is $13 and X, the
price a seller charges for bearing the risk, is $10. Because A(b) is greater
than X, the buyer will not avoid the risk by his own efforts; he will in-
stead bear it or shift it. Also, since R is greater than X, the decision will
be to pay X. If the buyer is unable to value A(b), however, he will be
unable to make a rational choice. He will know that it would be wiser to
ity, 27 MINN. L. Rlv. 117, 122-23 (1943) ; Williston, Representation and Warranty in
Sales-Heilbut v. Buckleton, 27 HARv. L. R!v. 1, 11 (1913) ; Note, Disclaimers of War-
ranty in Consumer Sales, 77 HARV. L. Rxv. 318 (1963). Generally, according to these
and other authorities, buyers expect sellers to bear risks, or sellers represent that they
will do so. Sellers, however, may shatter such buyer expectations or counteract the
effect of such representations by using exculpatory clauses. Sales law thus allows the
parties to bargain with respect to the location of risks of nonconformity and protects
the bargains the parties reach. As to the relationship between tort law and the policy of
protecting bargains see note 1 supra.
The word "bargain" may connote a jointly negotiated contract, but I use it to de-
scribe a policy of enforcing the deal the buyer agreed to, whether he participated in
negotiations or agreed to a form contract.
10. I use the following symbols:
R. - Risks of nonconformity.
p The probability a product will be defective.
P = The price of a product exclusive of charges for bearing the risk, R_
C - The cost which defects impose.
X - The charge sellers exact for bearing R.
Y = The charge insurance companies exact for bearing R.
A(s) = The seller's avoidance cost.
A (b) The buyer's avoidance cost.
CD - Consequential damages.
S = The cost to buyers of searching for favorable risk allocations.
>= Greater than.
< Lesser than.
The reader should note that R. ordinarily is the same for both parties: if a buyer bears
the risk, his cost is pC; if a seller bears the risk, he must compensate the buyer for any
losses, i.e., pay C, and thus risk cost to him is also pC.
11. Avoidance costs include the cost of avoiding a defect, such as installing a safety
device, and the cost of finding out what must be done to avoid defects. If a seller does
not know what it will cost to avoid a defect but believes the cost of finding out together
with the probable cost of altering the product to be higher than bearing the risk, his
avoidance costs are higher than that risk. The textual statement that X will equal R
or A(s) is inaccurate, but made for simplification. The correct statement is that X will
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shift R than to bear it since it is sensible to spend $10 to shift a $16 risk,
but he will not know whether to pay $10 and shift R or avoid it himself,
since he is ignorant of whether his own cost of avoiding the risk will be
less than $10. Similarly, if the buyer is unaware of R, he again cannot
make a rational choice. He will, of course, know that it would be better
to shift R than avoid it himself since a $10 payout is preferable to a $13
payout, and his business-sense will tell him that X is equal to, or less than,
R. But even with this knowledge, he can know from seeing X only that
R will be at least $10. If R is in fact $10, the decision whether to shift it
will not be made on a comparative cost basis (since both bearing R and
shifting it to the seller cost $10), but rather it will turn on other factors,
such as whether the buyer likes to gamble. However, when X is less than
R, as in my example, the buyer will pay X rather than bear R since $10
is less than $16. The buyer, therefore, must know R because knowledge
of X alone conveys insufficient information to make the requisite cost
comparisons. Finally, if the buyer is ignorant of X, he again cannot make
a rational choice, for reasons which by now should be plain.
A buyer must also know X, R and A (b) if the seller disclaims, thus
shifting the risk of nonconformity to him. The buyer in such a case will
be able to compare his own avoidance cost, A (b), with the risk's cost, R,
but he will not know X. Theoretically, however, buyers can ask sellers
to bear these risks, in which case sellers will quote X, which will then be
known. Indeed, there should be a submarket in risk-bearing. Thus,
whether sellers disclaim or not, buyers can make rational decisions if they
know their own avoidance costs, the prices sellers charge for bearing risks
of nonconformity and the value of those risks.
In the real world, the process by which buyers undertake to estimate
avoidance and risk costs is exceedingly complex. Computing avoidance
costs requires a knowledge of the product in question: one avoids defects
in cars differently than defects in lawn mowers. Valuing R also requires
knowledge of the product, to estimate the probability of defects and the
costs such defects impose. Many buyers in business know enough about
what they buy to be able to compute the cost of avoiding defects, for
example the cost of installing safety devices. Similarly, such buyers
can predict the likelihood of defects by, say, inspecting relevant samples,
and they can also estimate the costs defects cause. Other buyers,
however, probably cannot ascertain such information by themselves. For
them, rational decisions are possible only if the market produces sufficient
information to enable computations of A(b) and R. Often buyers do get
approach R or A(s), for under competitive conditions, X equals cost only when cost is
defined to include a return for the use of capital.
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some information relevant to A(b); many consumer products, for ex-
ample, contain warnings and directions for use. Also, as buyers use some
products frequently, such as soap and shoes, they will know something
about the likelihood of failure and its costs.
However, economic theory indicates that markets will often not pro-
duce enough information to enable accurate computations of R and A (b).
Information is a public good" in that consumption does not diminish
supply: everyone can use an idea. Therefore, information is unlikely
to be produced unless the producers can exclude those who wish to con-
sume without paying. Patent and copyright laws permit only partial
exclusion. The author of a book on how to invest wisely can, for ex-
ample, prevent others from selling the same ideas, but cannot obtain the
full value of those ideas since the millionaires he creates pay only the
book's sales price. Our economy thus underinvests in information rela-
tive to other things. It is not surprising, then, that information about
products also presents an exclusion problem: to enable rational choices,
data on products characteristics must be made available before purchase,
where it may be consumed by all potential buyers, some of whom may
decide to purchase a competing item or not to purchase at all. The dif-
ficulty of charging all consumers of information, including such free-
loaders (or preventing their access to the facts) may often make providing
this information cost more than it is worth. Theory thus tells us that sellers
are likely to underinvest in product information because other investments
will often be more profitable. 3  Impressionistic observations of the
12. A good introduction to the theory of public goods is A. ALcHIAN & W. ALLEN,
UNIVERSITY ECONOMICS 147-54, 245-47 (3d ed. 1972).
13. The argument that the inability to fully appropriate the value of information
results in an underinvestment in it derives from Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allo-
cation of Resources for Invention, in NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOaic RESEARCH, THE
RATE AND DIR TION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY (1962). See also Davis & Kamien,
Externalities, Information and Alternative Collection Action, in 1 THE ANALYSIS AND
EVALUATION OF PUBLIC EXPENDITURES: THE PPB SYSTEM, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 67
(1969). For a valuable commentary on Arrow see Demsetz, Information and Effici-
ency: Another Viewpoint, 12 J. LAW & ECON. 1 (1969).
Professor Hirshleifer recently argued that the possibility of making speculative
gains from the possession of information may counteract the tendency to underinvest
because of incomplete appropriability; one who has information, he claims, about the
occurence of a future event or the utility of a new technology may either sell it for a
large sum which will make it public, or take speculative positions on the basis of it and
then release it to the public because release makes the speculation profitable. Hirsh-
leifer, The Private and Social Value of Information and the Reward to Inventive Ac-
tivity, 61 Am. EcoN. REV. 561 (1971). However, the type of information with which we
are concerned, as to the probability and kind of defects in products and ways to avoid
them, is probably less susceptible to speculative exploitation or resale than other kinds
of information; the conventional argument thus applies here.
Professor Posner, however, also argues that the market's tendency to underinvest
in information will be counteracted by the incentive sellers have to inform consumers of
the defects of their competitors' products since such information allegedly will increase
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market, moreover, are consistent with this theory since useful data on
product failure and the avoidance of defects seems scarce.
Some buyers will also have difficulty valuing X, the price sellers
charge for bearing risks. X will tend to equal R or A(s). Buyers who
do not know R and who do not know enough about the product to com-
pute the cost to sellers of avoiding defects cannot make a priori calcula-
tions of X's value. They must instead search out that value by obtaining
price quotations, reading ads and so forth. These activities also entail
costs, in lost leisure time, in missed working time, in gasoline expended on
travel, and the like. Buyers must therefore make an additional decision
whether to incur search costs so as to ascertain X."5
Let us return to the original model, and assume that the seller dis-
claims. The buyer must then compare the value of the risk with his
own avoidance cost and the seller's price for bearing the risk. Also assume
that S is the marginal cost of the buyer's search per 'hour, and equals $5,
R is $10, and A(b) is $15. Since perfect price homogeneity is rare,
sales. Posner, Strict Liability: A Comnent, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 205, 211 (1973). The
costs to sellers of providing such information, though, are likely to exceed the gains.
Advertising defects in another's goods, if done by most sellers in a market, may create
the view in buyers' minds that the product generally is unreliable. Posner recognizes a
variant of this point in respect of safety information, as he realizes that advertising a
safety improvement may communicate the hazardous nature of the product. Id. But
there is no need to limit the observation to safety, for any stress on relative quality may
raise the spectre of the absence of quality. In addition, a seller who pursuasively charac-
terizes a specific competitor's goods as inferior must be sure he is right because dis-
paragement is a tort. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 128, at 915. In this regard, it may often
be difficult to get information as to a competitor's goods which is sufficiently reliable
to reduce the risk of a lawsuit to an acceptable level. The risk of lowering the product's
image to the public plus the risk of lawsuits for erroneous characterizations are there-
fore often likely to be higher than any gains in sales from demonstrating specific defects
in competitor's goods. But this is theory. The fact is that sellers seem seldom to dis-
close information in the manner Posner suggests. What is common is the institutional
ad in which an industry advertises that the products of all of its members are marvelous;
what is rare is specific criticism of one product by the maker of another.
14. For example, The National Commission on Product Safety, created by Con-
gress to report on product hazards in consumer markets, claimed "that insufficient spe-
cific information on product hazards is delivered to consumers." NATIONAL COMMISSION
ON PRODUCt SAFETY, FINAL REPORT 65 (1970). See also Stern, Consumer Protection Zia
Itcreased Information, in CoNsuEmsm: SEARCH FOR THE CONSUMER INTEREST 94 (D.
Aker & G. Day eds. 1971); Calabresi & Bass, Right Approach, Wrong Implications: A
Critique of McKean on Products Liability, 38 U. CHI. L, REv. 74, 88 (1970) [hereinafter
cited as Calabresi & Bass].
15. The concept of search costs is further explained and several of its important
implications discussed in Alchian, Information Cost, Priing and Resource Unemploy-
mnt, in MICRO-EcoNoMIc FOUNDATIONS OF EMPLOYMENT AND INFLATION THEORY 27
(1970) ; Nelson, Information and Consuimer Behavior, 78 J. POL. ECON. 311 (1970);
Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. PoL. EcoN. 213 (1961) ; Telser, Searching
For the Lowest Price, 63 Am. EcoN. Rlv. 40 (1973) ; cf. P. KEETON & M. SHAPO,- PROD-
UCTS AND THE CONSUMER: DECEPTIVE PRACricES 38-39, 62-80 (1972). These sources do
not discuss the implications search costs have for the allocation of risks of nonconformity.
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there will be a range of prices for bearing R, which can be described as
X(1), X(2) . . . . X(n). The buyer must now decide whether to bear
R, avoid it, or begin spending $5 per hour to find a seller who will bear
R at the lowest price. To know which choice to make requires the buyer
to estimate X's range, so. that he can decide whether to search at all, and
for how long. If, for example, X ranges between $9.50 and $10.00, a
buyer is unlikely to benefit enough by searching for a price on the lower
end to make searching worthwhile. If, on the other hand, X ranges from
$4.00 to $6.50, a search may be wise. Some buyers, however, will be
unable to estimate X's range since they are ignorant of both R and A(s).
In that case, not only will they not know X, they will not know whether it
will be profitable to begin looking for it.
Assume now that the initial seller agrees to bear risks for a price,
X(f). The buyer must then know whether to pay X(f) or look further.
This again requires him to estimate X's range, so that he can determine
whether X(f) is high or low. He must also estimate X's distribution:
if, for example, values of X cluster around X (f), it will seldom be worth-
while to search further, whereas, if those values cluster elsewhere or at
extremes, it may be worthwhile to search further if X (f) is high. Range
and frequency, however, are again functions of R and A (s), and will thus
be unknown to many buyers. Buyers who receive one quote for X will
therefore not know whether the price is good, nor will they know whether
it will be wise to continue searching.
When buyers cannot value R, A(b) and X's range and frequency,
the amount of search they do is a function of guesswork, not comparative
cost analysis, and the most common guess will be that search seldom is
worthwhile. It will seem easier simply to take the disclaimer or the first
price charged for bearing risks than to undertake a costly search the out-
come of which and need for which are unknown. Theory indicates that
markets in which buyers will not search exhibit either widely disparate
prices or terms of great similarity. With risks of nonconformity, simi-
larity of terms seems more probable. It is good business for sellers to
bear some risks of nonconformity since that indicates confidence in the
product and may increase sales. On the other hand, since the costs to
buyers of defects varies widely with buyer circumstances, its value is
difficult to predict. Sellers should then bear the risks that standard de-
fects may have to be repaired, standard parts replaced and, with low cost
items, prices may have to be refunded, for these are relatively simple
risks to value. By the same token, sellers should bear no other risks. If
uninformed buyers seldom search, contracts in markets where these buyers
operate should allocate risks in this way.
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The evidence, albeit sketchy, is that they do.'" Warranty clauses
accompanying the sale of quite different consumer products, for example,
contain remarkably similar risk allocations. These clauses shift to buyers
risks whose value is high or difficult to compute, such as the risk of re-
fund of the price of a car or of incurring personal injury, while allocating
to sellers risks whose value is low and easily predictable, such as the re-
placement of a standard part within a given time." Different products,
however, have different failure rates, and their failures impose disparate
costs; and different buyers are dissimilarly affected by defects. These com-
mon, standard clauses, then, do not reflect rational buyer comparisons
of the costs of bearing, avoiding or shifting risks; rather, they reflect the
lack of information available to many buyers, and the consequent decisions
of those buyers not to search in ignorance. 8
When buyers are too ignorant to make the requisite cost compari-
sons, allowing risks to be allocated by bargains makes little sense, since
society does not obtain the benefits of private ordering-the opportunity
for people to satisfy their wants themselves-which led courts to -allow
bargains intitially. There is, however, a related information problem,
which is whether buyers will absorb additional information if it is made
available. Suppose, for example, that sellers are required to disclose p,
the probability of defects, as a simple percentage (e.g., 1% break in year
one), some information as to the consequences of defects (so buyers
can compute R = pC), information about how buyers can avoid defects
(so they can value A (b), and the price charged for bearing R). There will
be much to read, but for those who want to read it, search costs should be
substantially reduced. As it stands now, much of the information that is
16. This observation derives largely from my own perceptions and the cases, both
of which indicate the ubiquity of the contractual clauses the text describes, but some
documentation does exist. An early but still valuable study is Bogert & Fink, Business
Practices Regarding Warranties in the Sale of Goods, 25 ILL. L. Rnv. 400 (1930). For
a brief description of the standard automobile warranty which fits this mold see C. GIL-
LAM, PRODUCTS LIABI rTY IN THE AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY: A STUDY IN STRICT LIABILITY
AND SOCIAL CONTROL 189-91 (1960) [hereinafter cited as GILLAm]. A more extensive
treatment is Whitford, Law and the Consumer Transaction: A Case Study of the Auto-
mobile Warranty, 1968 Wrs. L. REv. 1006. See also FTC, STAFF REPORT ONT AUTOMO-
BILE WARRANTIES 23, A-1 to -3 (1968). A recent Senate Report also scored what it con-
ceived to be the common and "current practice whereby a supplier gives an express war-
ranty while simultaneously disclaiming implied warranties ... " S. REP'. No. 92-269,
92d Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1971).
17. See authorities cited note 16 supra.
18. The text discusses only those aspects of buyer behavior in the face of uncer-
tainty which relate to allocations of the risk of nonconformity. For an interesting dis-
cussion and empirical survey of how consumer buyers perceive other risk aspects of
purchase decisions and inform themselves with respect to them see Gr6nhaug, Risk Indi-
cators, Perceived Risk and Consumer's Choice of Information Sources, 74 SWEDISH J.
EcON. 246 (1972).
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available to buyers is usually in raw form which is difficult to reduce to
order. Law reform, therefore, will permit many buyers to absorb more
information about products than they now do. Nevertheless, since the
degree of search engaged in is a functon of its costs and benefits, buyers
who value time spent in purchasing goods less than they value time in
other pursuits may continue not to search. For them, permitting bargains
may be senseless, unless the state wants to compel search by holding buyers
to deals made in ignorance, or is indifferent to the fate of those who prefer
other values to rational consumption.
Basically, the choices are clear. When society faces information
gaps, it can either attempt to provide buyers with information and induce
search, insofar as possible, or it can abandon the policy of protecting
bargains and impose risks on sellers. The former choice is preferable,
although it has costs, because it protects free buyer choice with respect to
where risks should be and what should be done about them. However,
which course should be pursued also depends largely on the efficacy of
bargains, as contrasted with imposed risk allocations, in achieving the
other goals of the courts: avoiding loss concentrations and improving
the quality of products.
Avoiding Concentrated Losses
Concentrating the losses of product defects on parties to sales is
undesirable.19 Courts or legislatures therefore should, it would seem,
allocate risks of nonconformity to the parties best able to spread these
losses. However, if parties are sufficiently informed to make rational
decisions about risks, there may be little need for imposed allocations
since the market will substantially reduce loss concentrations unaided.
(1) The Market Function
Assume X is the price a seller charges for bearing risks of noncon-
formity, that Y is the price an insurance company charges for bearing
them, that A(b) is the buyer's avoidance cost, and that the buyer knows
each of these costs. He will, of course, incur the least expense. Thus if
A(b) >X or Y and X or Y > R, B will pay the seller or an insurance com-
pany to bear R, depending on the value of X and Y. Either payment will
prevent losses from being concentrated on buyers. On the other hand, if
19. The justifications for avoiding loss concentrations, such as preventing the eco-
nomic and social dislocations they may cause, are thoughtfully explained in G. CALABRESI,
THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 39-67 (1970) [hereinafter cited as CALABRESI]. For typical
judicial statements of this goal see Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods. Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57,
377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962) ; Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453,
461-68, 150 P.2d 436, 440-44 (1944) (concurring opinion) ; Cintrone v. Hertz Truck
Leasing & Rental Serv., 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769 (1965).
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A(b)<X and Y and <R, the buyer will bear R himself. The latter
course of action could result in loss concentrations on buyers, but that
should seldom occur if avoidance costs are actually incurred, and R is
thereby either eliminated or ameliorated. Moreover, because another of
the courts' goals is to reduce the costs associated with defective pro-
ducts, judges should prefer buyers to bear R when A(b) <X and Y and
< R, for by doing so buyers will incur avoidance costs and reduce defects.
However, when A (b) and A(s) are greater than R, whether losses
will be spread will be determined by the buyer's penchant for gambling
and the buyer's wealth, not by comparisons between risk and avoid-
ance costs. Consider two buyers of a product whose risk value is $7.50,
where X is also $7.50. If the first buyer likes to gamble, while the second
has a compulsive desire for security, the first will bear R, the second will
pay X. Also, bearing R involves no expenditure of money, unless the
product becomes defective. Shifting R, however, always involves an
immediate expenditure since the buyer must pay X or Y. Buyers who
are rich and can easily absorb the cost of defects may save the payout and
gamble on bearing the risk. Buyers who are poor and have many claims
on their income may rank insurance against product failure lower in
priority than other things, such as clothing, and thus they may also
gamble by bearing R. Buyers in between will, as was said, bear R. or
shift it depending on their penchant for gambling."0
The situation of the rich self insurer is not very interesting, as most
of us care little about him, but the case of the poor buyer compelled to
gamble poses an important value choice. The question is whether courts
or legislatures should impose risks on those who sell to the poor because
otherwise some poor buyers who have gambled may be wiped out by de-
fects. I suggest these risk impositions should not be made. Imposing
risks on those who sell to the poor will not make the poor any richer; it
will only compel them to allocate their resources not as they see fit, but
as outsiders think is best for them. Until it is proved, which it so far has
not been, that outsiders can make better choices than the parties involved,
respect for individual choice compels the conclusion that the role of out-
siders should be to increase the poor's resources, not limit their options.2
20. The question whether to bear R or shift it does not turn on the likelihood of
defects. Let product one have a probability of defects of .75 and a defect cost of $10;
R=$7.50 (R=pC). Let product two have a probability of defects of .075 and a defect
cost of $100; R=$7.50. In case one, the probability of defects is ten times as great as
in case two, but the price of insuring against defects in relation to the costs of unshifted
losses is also ten times as high ($7.50 is 75% of $10; $7.50 is 7.5% of $100.). Thus,
the buyer of product one will be as likely to insure as the buyer of product two, unless,
as indicated above, he is more or less of a gambler or the wealth of the two is disparate.
21. Professor Buchanan makes a similar argument. Buchanan, In Defense of Ca-
veat Emptor, 38 U. C iI. L. IEv. 64 (1970).
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If, in sum, there were adequate information, bargains will do much
to prevent the concentration of product losses. Allowing people to bar-
gain, however, is to allow them to gamble. Thus, the principle issue which
the goal of preventing loss concentrations poses is whether the state should
impose risks or allow gambles. Before confronting this problem, however,
an analysis of the effect of information gaps on the pursuit of this goal is
necessary.
(2) The Information Problem
A lack of information is relevant in three ways. First, a buyer may
bear R but erroneously believes that R<A (b), in which case he will take
no steps to eliminate or decrease R. Such inaction may result in avoidable
losses being concentrated on him. Second, some buyers who accept the
standard seller provisions for allocating risks rather than searching for
better terms would in fact shift risks if they knew the costs involved.
Returning to the model used above, assume that R is $10, A(b) is $12,
and X ranges from $5 to $6.10 but clusters around $5.80. Also as-
sume that S is $5 (per hour), and that the buyer could absorb this infor-
mation and find a seller who would take R for $5.85 in forty minutes.
In this case, the buyer will shift R since the cost of a shift is $9.18, which,
of course, is lower than $10. If, however, the buyer does not possess the
information to value R, A(b) or X's range, he faces the possibility of
searching for hours with unpredictable gains, but all too predictable costs.
He is more likely to bear the risk. A third problem is that the relevant data,
when available, is in raw form, making search unduly costly and deter-
ring many buyers from searching at all.
These problems may be resolved by providing information relevant
to risk and avoidance costs, by reducing search costs, insofar as that is
possible, and then allowing the parties to shift risks through bargains.
Some buyers, however, may refuse to absorb the information, and for
them nothing will change. Alternatively, we could, by case or statute,
impose R on sellers, thereby compelling all buyers to "insure." This ap-
proach is undesirable for three reasons. First, since providing informa-
tion in concise form may substantially reduce search costs, buyers may in
fact absorb much of it, and shift risks, when the relevant costs so indicate,
more frequently than they now do. Risks should therefore be imposed on
sellers only if it is believed that the incidence of irrationally unshifted risks
will be too high even with additional information provided. Since this is
difficult to know in advance, information should be provided and the
results analyzed. Second, imposing risks prevents gambles but reduces
freedom of choice, which I take to be a value worth preserving for its own
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sake. Third, sellers cannot value certain of R's components, such as the
losses resulting to a buyer's business from the failure of a particular part,
as well as informed buyers can. If sellers bear risks such as these, they
will guess at the correct valuation.22 When the guesses are too high,
buyers will be paying excessive prices for shifting risks; when they are
too low, sellers may be underinsured.
Improving Product Quality
The goal of improving product quality has been a part of sales law
since at least 1829, when Chief Justice Best explained a decision to impose
an implied warranty of fitness on a copper manufacturer as compelled by
the court's "duty. . . to make it the interest of manufacturers and those
who sell, to furnish the best article that can be supplied."2 In recent
years the goal has been rephrased to provide that courts should hold liable
the party who can best (i.e., most cheaply) reduce the costs of defects.2"
No matter how the goal is phrased, however, it is misguided in bargain-
ing situations, where courts can only achieve what economists refer to as
optimality: that level of consumer sovereignty where no buyer can be
made better off by further market transactions without making another
buyer worse off.25
Imposing risks on a party will not, of itself, cause that party to do
things differently if risks could be completely shifted, for then change is
pointless. Risks, however, cannot be completely shifted. Should a seller
raise prices by the risk's value he will lose sales. Sellers must therefore
decide whether the loss of profit from raising the price by R is greater or
less than the loss caused by avoiding or amngliorating that risk. For ex-
ample, let P be the price, exclusive of risk costs, and R the risk cost. If the
seller disclaims, thereby shifting R to buyers, buyers face a cost of P + R;
if the seller does not disclaim, and instead charges R's value for bearing it,
22. That sellers may be unable to value certain of R's components is more fully
developed in the text accompanying notes 36-39 infra.
23. Jones v. Bright, 5 Bing. 533, 543, 130 Eng. Rep. 1167, 1171 (C.P. 1829). There
are, of course, modem cases with the same explicit thrust. See, e.g., Gardner v. Q.H.S.,
Inc., 448 F.2d 238 (4th Cir. 1971) ; Safeway Stores, Inc. v. L.D. Schreiber Cheese Co.,
326 F. Supp. 504 (W.D. Mo. 1971); Dobias v. Western Farmers Ass'n, 6 Wash. App.
194, 491 P.2d 1346 (1971).
24. E.g., Calabresi & Bass, spra note 14.
25. A fuller discussion of the Pareto optimality concept is in McKean, Products Li-
ability: Trends and Implications, 38 U. Cl. L. Rxv. 25-36 (1970). The point this sec-
tion will make, that optimality can be achieved with respect to the products liability bar-
gaining case regardless of which party bears risks, seems initially to have been noted
by Professors Blum and Kalven. See W. BLum & H. KALVEN, PuBLIC LAW PERSp.Ec-
TIVES ON A PRIVATE LAW PROBLEM-AuTo COMPENSATION PLANS 58-59 (1964). Be-
cause they were concerned with the nonbargain case of automobile accidents they did not
pursue the insight in the detail the text gives.
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buyers again face a cost of P + R. Whether sellers will avoid risks is
determined by whether P + R > P + A(s) ; that is, whether avoidance
cost is cheaper than risk cost. Sellers therefore face the same incentive to
avoid defects whether they disclaim or not, for in either case buyers will
perceive the total cost as P + R, and thus force sellers to compare risk
and avoidance costs.
The point is that when buyers can correctly value the risk, nothing is
to be gained by shifting that risk to sellers. When buyers cannot value the
risk, a shift will not necessarily yield improved products. Assume, for
example, that the seller disclaims, that A(s) is $8, R is $5, and that many
buyers perceive R as $9. Such buyers will be responding to artificially
high prices; hence they will purchase less, thereby possibly inducing the
seller to avoid defects. If a court bans the disclaimer, the seller (who pre-
sumably can value R) will raise price by $5 rather than avoid defects. If
this is done, those buyers who overvalued R will perceive a cost reduc-
tion of $4, with the result that purchases will increase and there will be
more defective products than before judicial intervention.26 By the same
token, when buyers undervalue risks, sellers who disclaim feel artificially
low pressure to. do things differently. In that case, banning the disclaimer
will then force a price of P + R or P + A(s), either of which will be per-
ceived by buyers who have undervalued R as higher than the costs they
previously faced. Matters will then be better since less will be bought, and
what is bought may be better made.
It is therefore misleading, in bargaining situations, to speak of im-
proving product quality or of finding the cheapest cost avoider. The
initial inquiry should be whether buyers are informed; if they are, nothing
further can be achieved by shifting risks between them. If buyers are unin-
formed, shifting risks to sellers may enable buyers only to perceive an
accurate valuation of X, but buyers need to know much more than this.
When, moreover, buyers are informed, they will determine by their pur-
chase decisions the amount and kind of defective goods produced; for if
they want defective goods, they will buy them. Informed choices, then,
produce optimality, i.e., the state in which the production mix accurately
reflects buyer wants. Private law should therefore seek an optimal number
of defects, not "better" products.
This somewhat technical analysis may be made clearer by consider-
ing in greater detail how risk allocations affect quality. The point to be
kept in mind is that optimality and whatever improvement in product
26. Buyer overvaluations may therefore be unusual, since it will be in the interest
of sellers to inform buyers by providing information or bearing R and pricing it accur-
ately. However, it may be difficult for sellers to know whether buyers are overvaluing
risks; the case the text describes may thus be more common than theory indicates.
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quality it brings can be achieved by bargains if buyers are informed. The
relevant inquiries remain the same-do buyers have information, and, if
not, what should be done to inform them?
(1) The Market Function
Using the model established earlier, assume that a product can prof-
itably sell for $10, not including risk costs of $5. If the seller bears the
risk, his price will be $15, and he will produce the number of defective
products a $15 price calls forth. If buyers bear the risk, they will face a
cost of $15-$10 for the price, $5 for bearing the risk, and we will again
have the output a $15 price produces. Optimality, then, is not affected by
risk allocation.
The ability of the market to reach optimality is also unaffected by the
parties' avoidance costs. If they are equal, and lower than R, whoever
bears R will choose to incur avoidance costs, but so long as they are equal,
output will remain the same no matter where 1R is put. If they are un-
equal, however, the parties will allocate R to the party whose avoidance
costs are lowest through bargains; and that, of course, will improve pro-
duct quality, since the lower these costs are, the more likely they are to be
incurred. In our example, if A(s) is $2 and A(b) $4, a buyer who bears
R faces a $14 cost. The seller can increase output, and thus profits, by
bearing R for that reduces buyer costs to $12. Sellers, then, will bear R
when A (s) <A (b) and also less than R. In competitive markets, there-
fore, optimality will be reached without the law's aid. 7
27. Even in noncompetitive markets, the law also should be unconcerned with the
risk allocations the parties reach, for similar reasons. See text accompanying notes 80-86
infra.
It should be noted that the process which allocates risks to the party whose avoid-
ance costs are lowest works less precisely than the above hypothetical indicates because
actual buyer avoidance costs sometimes vary. Assume, for example, that avoidance
costs are the sum of materials and labor. Sellers must be able to compare A(b) with
A(s), which means they must be able to know the prices and amount of material and
labor that buyers will require in order to avoid defects. Material should be compara-
tively easy to value since sellers probably know what materials can be used to avoid de-
fects-a safety clip or a face guard for example. Labor, however, is difficult to value
for two reasons. First, some buyers will take longer to install safety devices than others.
This should not be a major problem since sellers can probably predict a mean, although
these computations will be inexact. More seriously, labor cost can be hard to determine
in the case of individual proprietors or consumers who do not purchase labor at market
rates. Buyer Smith values an hour of his time (to install a safety device) as worth $5;
buyer Jones values his time as worth $8; A(b) (Smith)<A(b) (Jones). Thus, the
comparison between A(s) and A(b) will be difficult for sellers to make. Individual
buyers could, of course, disclose their own valuations, but this is an unlikely solution
since bargaining seems more infrequent when individuals are involved than in other cases.
I suggest, however, that this difficulty does not vitiate the analysis. It seems in-
tuitively probable that individual valuations of time will cluster around a rough mean
since they are partly a function of income and proclivity for safety, neither of which are
randomly distributed. An estimate of buyer avoidance costs may, therefore, not be too
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The import of all of this can best be perceived by applying it to some
common problems. It has been suggested that R should be imposed on
sellers when their insurance costs are lower than those of their buyers
because this will reduce the total cost of defective products."8 Differential
insurance costs, however, reflect the same phenomenon as differential
avoidance costs: if Y, the insurance premium, is lower for sellers than
buyers, sellers will bear R, pay Y and reduce X by the difference between
the two insurance charges because doing this enables them. to give to
buyers a costless price reduction. Differential insurance costs thus afford
no reason to allocate risks to particular parties.
Risks, it has frequently been said, should also be imposed on sellers
because this will stimulate research into making products safer.29 Such
research, however, will, or will not, occur wherever R is initially placed.
If R is $5, A(s) is $8, A(b) is $9 and the price absent risk costs is $10
the seller will, if he bears R, charge $15; buyers will, if they bear R, face
a $15 cost. If we put R on the seller, he may do research to reduce A(s)
to below $5 since people often attempt to lower costs. The spur to such
research, however, is the chance to increase output by a price reduction;
it is the feeling that $15 may be too high for many buyers. If, however,
the risk is placed on buyers, the seller faces the same spur, for his buyers
are reacting to what is, in effect, a $15 price. There is no assurance, of
course, that market pressures will induce research; the point, rather, is
that those pressures will be felt wherever R is initally put. A desire to
stimulate research into product improvement thus does not imply imposing
risks on sellers.
Courts, moreover, often misunderstand the contribution the market
can make toward achieving optimality, and thus wrongly intervene in
far off. Moreover, there will be a tendency f or sellers to correct errors: overvaluing
A(b) may cause sellers to bear risks buyers would take, which should not be done for
long; undervaluing-putting it as less than A(s) and thus disclaiming-will make the
product too costly for buyers, who will then bear risks they cannot avoid. The market
exerts pressure to reduce such costs to buyers. Nevertheless, it is more accurate to say
that in markets with individual buyers, sellers will only tend to bear risks they can avoid
more cheaply than buyers can. Even so, the issue is not whether market solutions are
perfect but whether they are better than others; it seems probable that even with the
rough estimates which must be made, markets will come closer than public interventions
to providing what buyers want regarding risk bearing, since sellers have the expertise
and incentive to make better guesses at such things as buyer avoidance costs than ad-
ministrators or legislators.
28. CALABRESI, supra note 19, at 164; Franklin, When Worlds Collide: Liability
Theories and Disclaimers in Defective Products Cases, 18 STAN. L. REv. 974, 1006 (1966)
[hereinafter cited as Franklin].
29. E.g., James, General Products-Should Manufacturers Be Liable Without Neg-
ligence, 24 TENN. L. REv. 923 (1957). See also, Stewart v. Budget Rent-A-Car Corp.,
52 Haw. 71, 470 P.2d 240 (1970).
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private transactions. An example of this involves a line of cases striking
down short contractual limitations of time in which to bring warranty
claims. In Wilson Trading Corp. v. David Fergson, Ltd.," for example,
the contract provided that no claims "relating to . . . shade shall be
allowed if made after weaving, knitting, or processing, or more than 10
days after receipt of shipment."'" The yarn in question "shaded," i.e.,
varied in color from piece to piece after processing. The court held that
if the defect in the yarn could only be discovered after processing, the
time limitation was made unenforceable by § 2-719(2) of the Uniform
Commercial Code, which bans a limitation on remedies that "circum-
stances" cause "to fail of its essential purpose. . . ."" The court felt
that this contract clause would result in the elimination of ". . . all
remedy for defects not discoverable before knitting and processing....""
Yarn, however, can apparently shade because it is defectively mantu-
factured or badly processed. If sellers bore the risk of poor processing,
their avoidance costs would be quite high for they would have to do such
things as educate processors or station observers in their factories.
Buyers, on the other hand, can avoid losses by merely processing care-
fully. In short, A(s) is probably higher than A(b). Where that occurs,
and the parties are knowledgeable, R is often on buyers; unsurprisingly
the clause at issue seems standard in the highly competitive garment in-
dustry. 4 Moreover, knowledgeable buyers, such as the defendant sweater
manufacturer, probably understand its consequences. The risk allocation
struck down in Wilson Trading, then, may have been optimal, and the
line of cases it epitomizes was thus questionably decided.
When people bargain the market will thus reach optimal solutions,
providing that level of defective products people want, without the law's
aid. The goal of improving product quality through risk allocations re-
quires no action by the state. Such inaction, however, assumes that buyers
are informed, and some may not be.
30. 23 N.Y.2d 398, 244 N.E.2d 685, 297 N.Y.S.2d 108 (1968).
31. Id. at 401, 244 N.E.2d at 686, 297 N.Y.S.2d at 110 (emphasis omitted).
32. The full subsection reads: "Where circumstances cause an exclusive or limited
remedy to fail of its essential purpose, remedy may be had as provided in this Act."
UxiFoRm ComlmcRm. CODE § 2-719(2).
33. 23 N.Y.2d at 404; 244 N.F_2d at 688; 297 N.Y.S2d at 113.
34. For other cases in which clauses much like it have been litigated see Granite
Worsted Mills, Inc. v. Aaronson Cowen, Ltd., 25 N.Y.2d 451, 255 N.E.2d 168, 306
N.Y.S.2d 934 (1969); Blends Inc. v. Schottland Mills, Inc., 35 App. Div. 2d 377, 316
N.Y.S.2d 912 (1970); Jessel v. Lockwood Textile Corp., 276 App. Div. 378, 95 N.Y.S.2d
77 (1950). Other cases which have come out the same way as Wilson Trading, and
which are susceptible to the same criticism, are Neville Chemical Co. v. Union Carbide
Corp., 422 F.2d 1205 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 826 (1970); Q. Vandeberg & Sons,
N.V. v. Siter, 204 Pa. Super. 392, 204 A.2d 494 (1964).
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(2) The Information Problem
A lack of information is relevant to the goal of achieving optimality in
several ways. Initially, buyers may know X but misvalue A(b). Should
they erroneously perceive it as higher than X, they will perceive a higher
cost for the product than in fact exists. It will be remembered that cost=
price + X or A(b). If the price is $10, A(b) is $3, and X is $4, but A(b)
is perceived as $5, then buyers will believe the cost to them to be $14, when
in fact it is $13. They will therefore purchase less of the product than they
in fact want, thus creating a nonoptimal situation. Conversely, if A(b)
is wrongly perceived as lower than X, buyers will purchase too much,
thereby increasing the number of defective items beyond buyer desire for
them, and artificially reducing the pressure on sellers to incur avoidance
costs. Next, remember that many buyers will refuse to search in ignor-
ance; they thus perceive themselves as facing a take it or leave it choice,
between agreeing to the risk allocations sellers make or not buying. A
factor relevant to this decision is the value of R; if it is high, the product
is more expensive than if it is low. When buyers cannot value R, there-
fore, they will often perceive a distorted price for the product, either too
high or too low. The results of such distortions will be the same as those
when A (b) is misvalued but X known, i.e., overvaluation unduly dampens
production and undervaluation unduly increases it, thereby increasing the
defects it yields. 5 In addition, if a buyer decides to buy and bear R, de-
fects will still be avoided if A(b) <R since it is rational, for example, to
spend $5 to avoid a $7 risk; but if buyers are ignorant of A(b), they may
believe it to be higher than R when it is not and thus take no avoidance
action. Finally, costs of searching for information are high, often deterring
buyers from undertaking a search.
These difficulties may be resolved by providing buyers with infor-
mation and reducing search costs, or by imposing risks on sellers, which
will force buyers ta react to their cost. Such risk impositions, however,
will themselves produce misallocations. When A(b) is less than A (s) and
also less than R, the cost is lowest if buyers bear risks; imposing risks on
35. Some commentators claim that individual buyers undervalue the risks they face.
CALABRESI, supra note 19, at 91, 163-64; Franklin, Tort Liability for Hepatitis: An
Analysis and a Proposal, 24 STAN. L. Rav. 439, 469 (1972). In fact, there is insufficient
evidence to ascertain what buyers do. See Posner, Book Review, 37 U. Cm. L. Ray. 636
(1970). Franklin makes reference to psychological studies in support of the claim,
Franklin, supra at 469 n. 179, but those studies apparently indicate only that people deduce
less from data than the data permits, not that people are risk takers. However, when
buyers lack information, they will probably overvalue or undervalue R; since overvalua-
tions dampen output more than free choice prefers, and undervaluations increase defects
unduly, the case for filling information gaps does not turn on the direction in which
buyers mistake the facts.
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sellers and prohibiting contracting out unneccessarily raises the cost of the
product, thereby yielding a nonoptimal solution. Of even greater signif-
icance are the misallocations that the consequential damage problem
causes.
For our purposes, consequential damages are those in excess of the
value (price) of the item, such as lost profits or personal injuries."
Again returning to the model used above, let us assume that a defect
renders a product worthless, and that P = price, p = probability of de-
fects, and CD = consequential damages. Thus R = pP + pCD. Conse-
quential damages, however, vary from buyer to buyer-a defect which
interrupts a production flow will cause more harm in one business than an-
other; a defect that causes a buyer to miss work costs an executive more
money than a clerk. The risk of nonconformity is thus different for each
buyer: R1 = pP + pCD1; R2 = pP + pCD2. Because consequential
damages vary among buyers, sellers will often be unable to value them
accurately. To see the results of this, assume P = $100, p = .01, A(s)
$1.60 and A(b) = $2.10. Our universe is six buyers.
CD (expected consequential damages) Risk Cost (pP + pCD = $1.00 + .01CD) 37
Buyer #1 $20 $1.20
Buyer #2 $30 $1.30
Buyer #3 $40 $1.40
Buyer #4 $70 $1.70
Buyer #5 $80 $1.80
Buyer #6 $90 $1.90
Buyers one, two and three may pay the seller the value of the risk to bear
it, but will not pay him to avoid it since for them while A(s) is less than
A (b), it is greater than R; buyers four, five and six would pay the seller
to bear the risk since for them A(s) is less than A(b) and less than R;
in these latter cases, the seller would avoid the risk as well. It is, how-
ever, expensive to charge each buyer a separate price. The seller may then
have at least two prices for bearing R-$1.00 to replace or refund if the
item is defective and $1.60 to bear all risks. Buyers four through six
would pay $1.60; buyers one through three would pay $1, and may then
36. More technically, consequential damages comprehend injury to person or prop-
erty from warranty breaches, and losses "resulting from general or particular require-
ments and needs [of the buyer] of which the seller at the time of contracting had reason
to know. . . ." UinUoR.M COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 2-715(2) (a), (b).
37. This equation is not completely accurate because the probability'that a product
will be defective and the probability that defects will cause consequential damages, such
as personal injury losses, may differ. For example, eyeglasses merely break much more
frequently than they injure eyes when they do break. The text's use of only one prob-
ability figure (p = .01) is made for simplicity.
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try to negotiate a separate- insurance arrangement. For them, it may be
that the seller will subcategorize between $1.00 and $1.60 by, say, agree-
ing to bear all risks for $1.30 (that is, he will pay up to $130 if the goods
are defective)."
Assume, now, that the seller is required to bear all risks with con-
tracting out prohibited. For each buyer R=pP+pCD. The seller, how-
ever, is ignorant of CD's value. He knows that he must charge more than
$1.00 to bear R, but does not know how much more, or whether he should
avoid defects or not. R will in consequence be arbitrarily priced, and
decisions to avoid it arbitrarily taken. Setting R at $1.75 in our illustra-
tion, for example, will result in no defects but will be wastefully high,
since in some cases more money is being spent to avoid a risk than the risk
is worth. By setting it at $1.55, on the other hand, defects are not avoided,
and sellers are underinsured. Imposing the entire risk of nonconformity
on sellers therefore assures resource misallocations.
No one now knows whether the misallocations attributable to seller
ignorance of one of 's components, together with the misallocations
caused by imposing R on sellers when A(b) <A(s) and R, outweigh the
misallocations which result from buyer ignorance. There is, however, a
choice between evils. While allowing buyers to bear risks produces in-
efficiencies, so also does imposing risks on sellers. This choice can be
avoided if the parties are allowed to bargain and buyers are provided with
information; they can then take information as to the probability and
nature of defects and value all of R's components, including those personal
to them, when deciding whether to bear or shift risks.8"
38. For some products it will be excessively costly to make a certain portion of
output less defective than the rest since their economies turn on making everything the
same way. This fact, together with seller inability to value CD and buyer ignorance
(and refusal to search in ignorance), cause many sellers to have only one price, pP or
$1.00 in the text's hypothetical, and to shift pCD, those damages in excess of price, to
buyers. See note 16 supra & text accompanying notes 8, 16-18 supra. Theoretically, sel-
lers could ascertain each buyer's circumstances so as to predict what consequential dam-
ages each buyer would suffer, but the costs of doing that would be prohibitive. Addi-
tional evidence confirming the conclusion that sellers ordinarily shift consequential dam-
age risks is found in the fact that only a handful of cases under the Code litigate these
damages, exclusive of cases in which an attempted shift of them to the buyer has been
stricken.
39. Professor Calabresi argues that if market solutions are chosen, risks should
be imposed on sellers when the buyers are individuals. CALABRESI, supra note 19, at 161-
73. The principal reason is that, as to personal injuries, "it will be virtually impossible,
for psychological reasons, adequately to inform individuals of the risk so that they can
properly evaluate it-they will simply refuse to believe it." Id. at 222 n. 18. See also id.
at 163. No evidence is adduced in support of the claim that people cannot bargain about
the risk that they will be injured or die, nor is it intuitively obvious. People who purchase
life and accident insurance bargain over precisely these things. I do not claim that
Professor Calabresi is wrong, only that there is little reason now to assume that people
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The Informatio' Concern
The three goals courts have pursued in connection with allocating
risks of nonconformity are to enforce the parties' bargains, to reduce con-
centrated losses and to improve product quality. These goals, however,
are in essence three facets of one ultimate aim, to let the parties do as
they wish. Buyers left free to choose will shift risks to sellers or others
whenever it is less costly to do that than it is to bear risks or avoid them,
thereby reducing loss cdncentrations; and buyers will also purchase so
as to call forth an optimal number of defective goods, which is all private
law can aspire to in the improvement of product quality. Pursuing free-
dom, which is an end in itself, therefore also entails pursuing utility. None
of these goals should be pursued, however, when buyers are too unin-
formed to value the risks they face, the costs necessary to avoid, those risks
and the price sellers charge for bearing them. It is thus pointless to allow
bargains on the premise that individuals can satisfy their wants better
themselves than outsiders can for them when those individuals cannot
know which risk allocations in fact will realize their wants. Nor, as we
have seen, will risks be rationally shifted or optimality achieved when
buyers cannot make the necessary cost comparisons. Although the evi-
dence is sketchy, it appears that in many markets buyers are insufficiently
informed to make pursuit of the courts' aims through bargains a wise
approach.4"
Society can continue to rely on bargains, but it must provide buyers
with the information necessary to value costs, and reduce search costs in-
sofar as possible. The alternative is to impose risks on sellers. I have
argued for the former solution on four grounds. First, bargains are pre-
ferable because they maximize an individual's choice in making purchase
decisions. Second, providing buyers with information interferes less with
this choice than imposing risks; it is thus to be preferred unless bargains
cannot take appropriate steps when informed of the risk of their own harm; thus policy
should not be based on Professor Calabresi's claim.
40. Note 10 supra, stated that R's value ordinarily is unchanged whether it is
borne by buyers or sellers. R will vary, however, if one of its components is repair
cost and one party can repair more cheaply than the other. Concretely, let there be a
1% chance of a repairable defect in year one; let the average repair cost to buyers be
$50; let the average repair cost to sellers be $40, because, say, they get reduced rates
from mechanics for volume purchases of repair services. As R=PC, and as C seller
< C buyer, the repair risk will be lower if borne by sellers than if borne by buyers. The
possibility of R varying with its location, however, does not change the analysis made
above. Differential risk costs are indistinguishable from differential avoidance costs.
Assume that A(b) and A(s) > R, so that neither party will avoid R. If R seller <
R buyer, the seller will bear R, for the same reasons he will bear R if avoidance costs
are low enough to be relevant and A(s)<A(b). The text assumes an invariant risk
cost to facilitate analysis. Finally, the process whereby sellers will bear R, if R is
lower when on them than when on buyers, also presupposes informed buyers.
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will continue to yield too many unshifted losses after information is pro-
vided. Since it is difficult to know in advance whether this will happen,
information should be made available and the results checked. Third,
providing information will enable more accurate prices for risk shifting,
thereby preventing insufficient or excessive insurance charges. Fourth,
which is a facet of the third, informed bargains can yield less misalloca-
tions than risk impositions. 1 All of this, however, ignores two difficult
problems, the costs of reform and the value aspects of the costs of search.
The first is discussed here, the second in the following section.
I have throughout been dealing with a model of a product that has
one moving part, and which will be defective only if that part breaks.
Products, however, are often more complex than this. A television set can
be defective if the fine tuner breaks, or the vertical hold goes or the picture
tube fails. The probability of a defect is the sum of the probabilities of
each of these, and the cost of a defect is the sum of the costs of each of
these; symbolically, R = r1 + r2 + r3. . . . With respect to some pro-
ducts, the various probabilities can be summed, and a single figure for R
given without seriously misleading buyers; but when we consider some-
thing like a car, the statement that there is a 2% chance that "the car"
will be defective begins to seem meaningless. The probability of de-
fects and the costs defects impose will vary so widely among the different
parts that buyers do not need one probability figure but several, not one
lesson on how to avoid defects but possibly many. This raises a number
of difficulties. How, and by whom, is it to be decided which products can
be accurately characterized by unitary values for R and X and a single
description of cost avoidance methods? For the products which cannot,
how much particularity is there to be? Some of the information which
seems necessary, sellers themselves may not know. How is this informa-
tion to be discovered? For some products a precise probability may be
impossible to calculate. How close must an approximation be? In what
form must information be disclosed? In some circumstances, such as
sales from vending machines, providing pre-sale information may be
impossible. Who is to decide when these circumstances exist, and what
then should be done ?42 Although this article does not answer these ques-
41. In addition, Professors Demsetz and Buchanan show that imposing risks on one
set of parties to contracts, such as sellers or employers, makes poorer those other parties
to the contracts who prefer disposable income to insuring against risks, or who prefer
to insure with others than their contract partners. Buchanan, supra note 21; Demsetz,
Wealth Distribution and the Ownership of Rights, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 223 (1972).
42. The text's inquiries may be stated more fully. Should sellers, for example, be
required to produce and disclose information at their own expense? Should the govern-
ment produce information, as in the case of agricultural grading, see The Agricultural
Marketing Act of 1946, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1621, 1622 (1970), and require sellers to disclose
it? Should sellers provide information to the government to be disseminated to the pub-
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tions, one fact can be noted: a serious effort to provide information will
impose substantial costs, to know what information is important, to get
it and to ensure accurate disclosure.
Whether to impose risks or provide information partly turns on
comparison between the cost of risk impositions as opposed to the cost of
providing information, and between the gains which bargains yield as
opposed to the gains from imposing risks. These comparisons today can-
not be made precisely; reformers can only guess. However, courts,
which are presently imposing risks, are also guessing. I suggest the
opposite guesses should be made for the reasons previously given. This
concededly is a position which cannot be argued with excessive force in
the absence of evidence, but what can confidently be asserted is that the
facts should be sought before courts commit themselves to imposing risks
when consumers are involved, or not doing so when businessmen deal
with one another, or adopt compromise solutions without principle.
Search Costs, Value Choices and the Question Whether to Impose Risks
I previously assumed all buyers to face the same search costs, but
these costs in fact differ because buyers value their time differently. With
individual buyers, search costs are partly a function of the value put on
leisure; many people shop when they would otherwise be engaging in
recreation or family life. Search costs are thus much higher for a person
who loves golf than for one who loves bargains; providing information
will then be of more use to, and will more likely be absorbed by, bargain
hunters. Should search costs be sustantially reduced, by capsuling the
relevant information, they will therefore remain high enough to preclude
search by some buyers for whom a significant element of search costs is
foregone leisure. Given American tastes and the amount of information
lic as is done with some safety information under the Consumer Product Safety Act §
5(a) (1), 15 U.S.C.A. § 2054(a)(1) (Supp. 1973), Pub. L. No. 92-573, § 5(a)(1), 86
Stat. 1211 (1972) ? Should the government develop information itself and communicate
it to consumers, as will be done with certain information as to automobile safety and
reliability by the Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings Act § 201, 15 U.S.C.A. §
1941 (Supp. 1973), Pub. L. No. 92-513, § 201, 86 Stat. 956 (1972)? What is essential
to be disclosed is the probability (p) of defects together with some information as to
their form, the costs they are likely to produce and the methods of avoiding them. If
information is to come from sellers, how is the transmission to be policed, and by whom?
How can search costs best be reduced? It also seems likely that whichever choices are
made some administrative presence will be required, to provide information or to police
its provision. For a thoughtful discussion of some of these issues, though not concerned
with the communication of information respecting risks of nonconformity but rather the
problem of how any sales information can be effectively communicated to buyers, see
Whitford, The Functions of Disclosure Regulation in Consiuner Transactions, 1973 Wis.
L. REv. 400, 439-63.
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which must be absorbed, there may be many such buyers. What then
should be done about it?
This is not a question to which there is a logical answer. A market
economy necessarily presupposes that buyers will participate in the con-
sumption game, and that must imply some indifference to the fate of non-
participants. Such indifference, moreover, raises the cost of nonparticipa-
tion and may reduce it. The argument that some buyers will not absorb
information, therefore, is an insufficient response to the suggestion that
information be provided. The real issue is whether the consequences to
obdurate nonparticipants will be so enormous and unpleasant as to out-
weigh the gains which market solutions yield. This cannot be known
exactly; indeed it is one of those questions the answers to which are deter-
mined as much by the values of the person asking as by the methods used
to find answers. Thus, a man may bear heavy accident costs because he
failed to search for a contract which shifted risks to sellers. To one per-
son, his suffering is the regretable but deserved consequence of sloth, and
a useful lesson to others; to a second person, all remediable suffering
should be eliminated, even if it means that people must be protected against
their own weaknesses. To the extent that analysis is relevant to this issue,
my thesis is that bargains provide substantial benefits. Moreover, there
will be fewer nonparticipants after information is provided than there now
are because nonparticipating will be more costly than it is today and in-
formation will be easier to get. We should, therefore, ascertain how much
suffering a new solution will produce rather than abandon it untried.43
The Problem of Neutrally Enforcing Bargains
Allowing private parties to allocate risks of nonconformity implies
state neutrality to the allocations reached-freedom means freedom.
Reducing loss concentrations on buyers and improving product quality
through bargains also implies state neutrality with respect to the bargains
struck, because the parties' pursuit of self-interest in negotiations achieves
these results. At present, however, although private law ostensibly per-
43. A third choice, instead of imposing risks or providing information, is to let
bargains be made in ignorance-to do nothing. I reject this for two reasons. First,
things are now being done, by judicial risk impositions and public regulation of quality,
see note 8 supra, and the movement seems unstopable. Second, doing nothing is the
worst choice because the gains from risk impositions, although it is the second best solu-
tion, are likely to exceed the costs of making them.
Providing information, finally, need not be an all or nothing solution. Consider a
case where seller and buyer avoidance costs exceed risk costs, R==;1, and the cost of
providing information in the requisite detail is $3 per unit. Here, ignorance is cheaper
than knowledge and may sensibly be preferred. The administrative presence referred to
in note 42 supra perhaps should be authorized to exempt sellers in such cases from pro-
viding information or to reduce the amount which must be disclosed.
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mits bargains, they are often not neutrally enforced. It is instructive to
see why.
(1) The Problem
The contract often explicitly allocates risks between the parties.
Courts, however, frequently refuse to take the contract at face value when
a risk allocated to the buyer has materialized into a loss. This tendency
is illustrated by cases concerning disclaimers of warranty liability. The
Uniform Commercial Code regulates the form of such disclaimers and
in some cases their content.44 The significant point for present purposes
is that the statute treats all buyers alike. If a disclaimer of the warranty
of merchantability is in proper form, it is enforceable, whatever the market
status of the buyer." Nevertheless, cases under the Code reveal a sharp
contrast in the treatment of buyers wtho seem knowledgeable about the
products they buy or about business practices accompanying sales, and
buyers who seem ignorant of both. Greater duties of reading and under-
standing contract terms are imposed on the former than on the latter.
For example, in twenty-two cases involving knowledgeable buyers, ex-
culpatory clauses were enforced seventeen times, although some of them
did not appear conspicuous or were on the back of forms." Yet in forty
cases involving arguably ignorant buyers, such as a consumer or a small
businessman, exculpatory clauses were enforced but seven times.4
44. See UNIFORM CoMrERCIA CODE §§ 2-316, -719.
45. This is the conclusion UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-316 yields, but the caveat
to it is that courts may nevertheless hold a disclaimer proper in form to be unconscion-
able. Jefferson Credit Corp. v. Marcano, 60 Misc. 2d 138, 302 N.Y.S.2d 390 (Civ.
Ct. 1969); accord, Jacobs v. Metro Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 125 Ga. App. 462, 188
S.E.2d 250 (1972) (dictum); see J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 12-11, at 386-92 (1972). Contra, Avery v.
Aladdin Prods. Div., Nat'l Serv. Indus, Inc., 128 Ga. App. 266, 196 S.E.2d 357 (1973).
46. The survey this paragraph reports is based on the warranty cases in 1 to 8
Uniform Commercial Code Reporter; later authority is consistent with it. Knowledge-
able buyers are primarily business purchasers obtaining products under circumstances
which should make them familiar with their use-for example, a chemical manufacturer
purchasing a reactor according to specifications it supplied. See, e.g., Southwest Forest
Indus., Inc. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 422 F.2d 1013 (9th Cir. 1970) ; Wyatt Indus.,
Inc. v. Publicker Elec. Corp., 420 F.2d 454 (5th Cir. 1969); Construction Aggregates
Corp. v. Hewitt-Robins, Inc., 404 F.2d 505 (7th Cir. 1968); K & C, Inc. v. Westing-
house Elec. Corp., 437 Pa. 303, 263 A.2d 390 (1970).
Surveys such as these are of limited utility because the cases contain too few facts
to make the categories precise. For this reason, and because string cites of twenty or
more cases are too long, citation to all of the cases used is not given. The quantification
should only be taken to indicate that courts impose fewer obligations on some classes of
buyers than on others.
47. Moreover, seven of these cases involved used goods, where buyers presumably
expect to bear greater risks; sellers won four of these cases. Thus when a buyer was
perceived as inexpert, and bought new goods, exculpatory clauses were not enforced in
thirty of thirty-three cases. These figures as to the ineffectiveness of disclaimers when
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An analysis of some of the cases gives a better idea of what the courts
are doing. Section 2-316(2) of the Code provides that ". . . to exclude
or modify the implied warranty of merchantability or any part of it the
language must mention merchantability and in case of a writing must be
conspicuous.. . "48 Section 1-201 (10) defines a conspicuous term as
being ". . . so written that a reasonable person against whom it is to
operate ought to have noticed it," and goes on to say, "Language in the
body of a form is 'conspicuous' if it is in larger or other contrasting type
or color."4 In Hunt v. Perkins Machinery Co.,5" the plaintiff purchased
a diesel engine for his fishing boat. The sales contract was a one page
form. "In the center of the face of the order in bold face type capitals"
was the statement that the order was subject to "TERMS AND CONDI-
TIONS STATED" in it; on the back, at the top, in the same type was the
heading "TERMS AND CONDITIONS ;" and in the third paragraph
on that reverse side was a disclaimer of the merchantability warranty
which satisfied the Code's requirements as to phraseology."' Plaintiff,
however, "did not read anything on the back of the order when he signed
it."52 The court noted that the contract was annexed to a pad of order
forms and held:
[T]he provisions on the front of the purchase order did not
make adequate reference to the provisions on the back of the
order to draw attention to the latter. Hence the provisions on
the back of the order cannot be said to be conspicuous although
printed in an adequate size and style of type. The disclaimer
was not effective.
5 3
That a commercial fisherman may, or ought to, have been aware that
contracts are often printed on both sides of a page was not discussed.
In Minikes v. Admiral Corp.,4 plaintiff complained of a defective
refrigerator. The purchase order recited, "in larger type" than the rest of
the form, that "All orders are subject to the following:" Immediately
"ignorant" buyers purchase new goods are consistent with Professor Whitford's study
of automobile litigation, although his data included pre-Code cases and cases in which
negligence was alleged. Whitford, Strict Products Liability ad the Automobile Indus-
try: Much Ado About Nothing, 1968 Wis. L. REV. 83, 104-06, 128-32, 134-39 [herein-
after cited as Whitford].
48. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-316(2).
49. Id. § 1-201(10).
50. 352 Mass. 535, 226 N.E.2d 228 (1967).
51. Id. at 535, 226 N.E.2d at 229.
52. Id. at 536, 226 N.R.2d at 229.
53. Id. at 541, 226 N.E.2d at 232; accord Massey-Ferguson, Inc. v. Utley, 439
S.W.2d 57 (Ky. 1969). The Kentucky court, however, later partly recanted. See Chil-
ders & Venters, Inc. v. Sowards, 460 S.W.2d 343 (Ky. 1970).
54. 48 Misc. 2d 1012, 266 N.Y.S.2d 461 (Dist. Ct. N.Y. 1966).
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thereafter was a disclaimer, in "smaller type than on the rest of the 'pur-
chase order.' "" The court observed:
The burden of preparing an effective disclaimer is heavy. It is
one of the hazards of the business. Before a merchant can dis-
qualify for the implied warranties the public has become ac-
customed to, it must show that the customer was clearly
placed on notice. 6
It then struck the disclaimer as being inconspicuous because it was
"smaller, not larger, than the rest of the purchase order . . . ."" The
opinion gave no reasons why disclaimers were disfavored other than the
partially relevant but unsupported assertion that the public expected the
warranty, 8 nor did it acknowledge that the Code permitted disclaimers
without imposing special burdens on sellers, nor did it consider that sec-
tion 1-201 (10)'s authorization of disclaimers in "other contrasting
type" 9 could include smaller print preceded by a larger print signal.6"
The object of the judges in these cases is not to find out what the
buyer's understanding of the terms in fact was, and to protect it, but to
55. Id. at 1012, 266 N.Y.S.2d at 462.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1013, 266 N.Y.S2d at 462.
58. Id. at 1012, 266 N.Y.S.2d at 462.
59. UNIFOPM CoA1FacxIAL. CODE § 1-201(10).
60. In a more recent example, this time in a suit between businesses, it was held:
Finally, defendant Western Farmers contends the trial court erred in denying
its cross-claim for indemnity against defendant Stauffer Chemical Company.
The trial court found that Western Farmers, in advising the use of Eptam to
the plaintiffs, relied on the information furnished by Stauffer Chemical Com-
pany that Eptam was suitable for application to sweet corn in the Moses Lake
area. The trial court, however, denied indemnity over against Stauffer Chemi-
cal because it found that Western Farmers Association had full knowledge of
the disclaimer provisions under which the Eptam was sold to them by Stauffer
Chemical Company. Knowledge of a disclaimer is not sufficient to give effect to
that disclaimer so as to defeat an action for breach of warranty. A disclaimer
to be effective must be bargained for. RCW 62A. 2-316. Henningsen v.
Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 361 A.2d 69 (1960), Berg. v. Stromme,
79 Wash. 2d 184, 484 P.2d 380 (1971). Disclaimers of warranty are dis-
favored in the law and ineffectual unless explicitly negotiated between the
buyer and seller and set forth with particularity showing the particular quali-
ties and characteristics of fitness which are being disclaimed. Berg v. Stromme,
supra. In the instant case the alleged disclaimer was not part of the contract
between Western Farmers and Stauffer, but was merely a caveat emptor proc-
lamation contained on the label of the container. It was doubtlessly intended
for the ultimate user of the product, who might be reasonably expected to suf-
fer damage from its use. When a retailer incurs liability to the ultimate con-
sumer by reason of his negligent reliance upon statements made by the manu-
facturer of a dangerous product, indemnity will lie.
Dobias v. Western Farmers Ass'n, 6 Wash. App. 194, - , 491 P.2d 1346, 1350 (1971);
accord, DeCoria v. Red's Trailer Mart, Inc., 5 Wash. App. 892, 491 P.2d 241 (1971).
The Code, however, contains no requirement that disclaimers to be effective must be
bargained for.
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ascertain what the buyer should have expected the terms to be.6 ' Actual
understandings are unprotected because they are hard to ascertain, and
because they may be aberrational. A buyer, for example, could believe,
on no evidence and despite the contract, that a particular risk was on the
seller; should that belief be protected, the seller may bear costs which he
cannot anticipate. These cases thus construct models as to what terms
the normal buyer should expect, rather than hold buyers to the terms
actually present. Their constructions, however, are unsatisfactory, because
these models are functions of facts and policy, while the opinions discuss
only some of the facts and almost none of the policy.
As far as factual questions are concerned, the wording and location
of exculpatory clauses are plainly germane. But so also is what sellers
ordinarily do. Sellers of new cars, for example, have refused to do more
than repair or replace defective parts for over fifty years." A new car
buyer who expects his seller to bear the risk of consequential damages
thus has an aberrational view of the transaction, which should not be
protected unless the circumstances indicate that, on the particular facts, it
was plausibly held. Another fact relevant to what buyers should expect is
what they normally do expect. If buyers in a given market expect sellers
to bear only certain risks, a buyer with a standard contract but a different
expectation should be bound by the contract unless other aspects of the
deal took it out of the norm. Many cases, however, ignore evidence as to
what sellers do and buyers expect, even when the evidence is inconsistent
with the results those cases reach.
Thus in some markets it is customary for sellers to shift risks of non-
conformity to buyers. Sellers of seeds,63 adhesives64 and works of art"5
often shift all such risks. Sellers of most consumer durables, on the
other hand, will repair defective parts, or replace them within a particular
time, but they will seldom replace the entire product or refund the price,
61. See Murray, Unconscionability: Unconscionability, 31 U. PITT. L. REv. 1, 14-
23 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Murray].
62. E.g., GILLAM, supra note 16, at 189-91.
63. E.g., Walcott & Steele, Inc. v. Carpenter, 246 Ark. 95, 436 S.W.2d 820 (1969);
Klien v. Asgrow Seed Co., 246 Cal. App. 2d 87, 54 Cal. Rptr. 609 (1966) ; Belt Seed
Co. v. Mitchelhill Seed Co., 236 Mo. App. 142, 153 S.W.2d 106 (K.C. Ct. App. 1941);
Lumbrazo v. Woodruff, 256 N.Y. 92, 175 N.E. 525 (1931); Smith v. Oscar H. Will &
Co., 51 N.D. 357, 199 N.W. 861 (1924). See also Ezer, The Impact of the Uniform
Commercial Code on the California Law of Sales Warranties, 8 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 281,
313-14 (1961) ; Note, Implied Warranties: Effect of Usage on Implied Warranty of
Quality, 12 CALIF. L. REV. 523 (1924) ; Note, Effect of Non-Warranty Clauses in Sales
Contracts, 31 COLUm. L. REv. 1325, 1328, 1333-34 (1931).
64. Roto-Lith, Ltd. v. F.P. Bartlett & Co., 297 F.2d 497 (1st Cir. 1962); Green-
spun v. Am. Adhesives, Inc., 320 F. Supp. 442 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
65. E.g., Weisz v. Parke-Bernet Galleries, Inc., 67 Misc. 2d 1077, 325 N.Y.S.2d 576
(Civ. Ct. 1971).
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and will almost never agree voluntarily to bear consequential damages.6
Although sellers often praise their products, the contracts they make
shift a large proportion of risks to buyers. Yet courts seldom infer, or
consider the possibility of inferring, that the apparent pervasiveness of
this custom may mean that buyers should ordinarily expect some form
of disclaimer.
Furthermore, the middle class today commonly laments the poor
quality of many domestic products, and the habit of sellers not to make
good their failures. Likewise, many of our urban poor are regarded as
deeply mistrustful of merchants who sell shoddy goods, but make no re-
compense for them. 7 In many cases, the middle class and poor may ex-
pect to bear risks, whether they read sales contracts or not. Protecting
such buyers against "unread clauses" is thus inconsistent with a policy
of protecting their expectations. Finally, the scant empirical evidence we
do have about buyer expectations indicates that consumers frequently
expect to bear personal injury losses themselves."8 Yet it is in just these
situations that courts try hardest to impose risks on sellers."9
This is not to say that the models many courts have developed, as
to what buyers should expect the terms to have been, are factually errone-
ous, for the contrary evidence is all too tentative. However, because we
are ignorant of many facts relevant to these models, it is difficult
to apply them neutrally.
These models are also shaped by policy considerations. It may be
prudent, for example, for buyers to read fine print and have arcane terms
translated since it is a commonplace that people are bound by what they
sign. Yet the law today seldom requires buyers to do these things; the
cases instead hold that a buyer who is ignorant of the contents of fine
print "should not" have expected those contents."0 The real issue is the
extent to which buyers should have to inform themselves about the trans-
actions they make. The cases, however, seldom answer this question.
More commonly they beg it by criticizing such things as fine print or legal
language (when neither would be a barrier to holding buyers to sales con-
66. See note 17 supra & text accompanying.
67. Allegations of the poor's suspiciousness were made by President Johnson's Riot
Commission. REPORT OF TE NATIONAL ADVIsORY CommIssiON oN CIvIL Disoa ans 274-
75 (1968) (N.Y. Times ed.). See also Comment, Consioner Legislation and the Poor, 76
YALE L.J. 745, 746, 753-54 (1967).
68. Whitford, supra note 47, at 148. Professors O'Connell and Simon surveyed 391
automobile accident victims and found that 72 per cent of them did not expect compen-
sation for pain and suffering before their accidents; the authors suggest that people who
purchase products have similar expectations. O'Connell & Simon, Payment for Pain and
Suffering: Who Wants What, When and Why?, 1972 U. ILL. L.F. 1, 15, 19, 54 (1972).
69. E.g., Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
70. See text accompanying notes 54-61 supra.
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tracts if we chose to require buyers to read documents), or they mechani-
cally cite the statute.7 The consequence of this is a lack of predictability.
Although the cases fall into rough patterns, such questions as which
buyers will be classified as ignorant, how much ignorant buyers must do
and what seller language will suffice to shift risks to buyers are today
quite alive after years of litigation.
The silence of many courts on these important questions of facts and
values is the obvious result of doing one thing while saying another--of
purporting to protect bargains while instead imposing risks on sellers. It
is important to ask why courts have done this, for it must not be done if
the law is to rely on .the parties' bargains as the means of achieving
its goals.
(2) Causes of the Problem and Possible Cures
The results I have described are attributable primarily to the limita-
tions of the judicial process. In the first place, courts cannot conduct
surveys to ascertain what sellers actually do and what buyers in fact ex-
pect, nor are they likely to be informed in these respects by litigants be-
cause the cost of finding facts such as these will almost always outweigh
the amounts in suit. Thus, the judges must apply a policy of protecting
bargains, which has a large factual content, without the facts. When that
is done, the tendency to view the world through the distorting lens of
policy is almost irresistible.
The failure to resolve the information concern has also contributed
substantially to the courts' difficulties. When buyers are perceived as
lacking information, the policy of protecting bargains appears to clash
with the policies of avoiding loss concentrations and improving product
quality. I have previously argued that courts should not protect bargains
when buyers are uninformed since the principal benefit private ordering
yields is that decisions are made by the most competent persons (i.e., those
who are attempting to satisfy their own wants), and this benefit dis-
appears when buyers are ignorant. The more common view is that if a
buyer is aware of the contract's risk allocation, that allocation should be
enforced; in other words, many think the requirements which freedom of
contract imposes are satisfied if the buyer knows he is bearing R. The
Code, moreover, lends support to this view, because it implies that con-
spicuous disclaimers should be enforced.7 - However, a buyer who knows
71. See also, e.g., Holcomb v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 439 F.2d 1150 (5th Cir. 1971) ;
Ford Motor Co. v. Reid, 250 Ark. 176, 465 S.W.2d 80 (1971); Sarnecki v. Al Johns
Pontiac, 56 Luz. Leg. Reg. Rep. 293, 3 UCC REP. SERV. 1121 (Pa. C.P. 1966) ; Zabriskie
Chevrolet, Inc. v. Smith, 99 N.J. Super. 441, 240 A.2d 195 (1968).
72. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-316(2).
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only that he is bearing R, but who is ignorant of the values of it, A (b)
and X may fail to shift R when that would be the cheapest course, and he
may continue to purchase products with risk costs sufficiently high to
have precluded purchase, if those costs were actually known. Thus, en-
forcing the risk allocation may neither reduce loss concentrations nor
improve product quality. The belief that the three policies I have been
discussing are inconsistent has been largely responsible for the frequent
adoption of strict liability in tort, which imposes risks on sellers regard-
less of the buyer's knowledge of exculpatory clauses.7" Courts which use
the Code, however, often believe they have to reconcile the apparently
conflicting policies of protecting bargains, avoiding loss concentrations
and improving product quality. The difficult and controversial choices
involved create enormous pressure to resolve matters by findings of "fact"
that the buyer either did or did not know of the risk allocation, depending
on the desired result, with the consequence that the policy of protecting
bargains becomes a label, not a directive. This tendency, moreover, is
exacerbated by the inability of courts to eliminate information gaps.
Judges cannot gather the requisite facts, for example, as to the percent
of defectives in a particular product batch, nor can they make the facts
available to buyers prior to purchase. Instead, they can do nothing but
enforce bargains possibly made in ignorance or impose risks on apparently
informed sellers, and it is the latter choice that has often surreptitiously
been made.
The state can ease these difficulties by supplementing the courts'
institutional limitations, and also by resolving the policy conflicts. We
should, for example, consider the use of administrative agencies to find
the facts which a decision to enforce bargains makes relevant, and possibly
to enforce them. Also, if legislatures were to choose the values which the
courts are to realize, judges could make clearer decisions on the facts
which are available. A more satisfactory resolution is to regulate the dis-
closure of information, including the form of exculpatory clauses, and then
make the contract almost the sole evidence of the bargain in the absence
of fraud. This will afford ease of administration, predictability and the
reduction of the personal element in decisionmaking. Bargains, in sum,
can be neutrally enforced, but only if the causes of the present tendency
to impose risks on sellers are eliminated.
73. Comment vs to § 402A of the RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS states that the
"consumer's cause of action . . . is not affected by any disclaimer or other agreement,
whether it be between the seller and his imnmediate buyer, or attached to and accom-
panying the product into the consumer's hands." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
402A, Comment in, at 356 (1965). See also, e.g., Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61
Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1964).
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II. THREE PROBLEMS IN PRIVATE LAW
Part II deals with three problems which warranty and tort law have
encountered: (1) the question, peculiar to warranty, whether sales con-
tracts have an "essence" which allocates risks of nonconformity in certain
ways; (2) the problem of "excessive" seller bargaining power; and(3)
the issue whether vertical privity barriers should be abolished.
These problems arise in traditional law suits; and any criticism of
their solutions must take into account the constraints which that method
of dispute resolution imposes. Part II, in contrast to Part I, is there-
fore not an attempt to devise the best solution; it is written primarily as a
critique of judicial solutions and an argument for different ones. The
limited focus of the discussion, however, should not be taken to imply
an approval of the use of the judicial process in this field. Both for the
reasons previously given as to the efficacy of that process, 4 and because
courts often seem strongly committed to their own resolutions, legislation
may be the only satisfactory law making device.
Essence
The essence doctrine allocates risks of nonconformity to sellers de-
spite disclaimers. Although the contract may shift these risks to the
buyer, courts will impose them on the seller if the "essence" of the trans-
action at issue is that sellers bear these risks. A comment to the express
warranty section of a 1944 Draft of the Code, discussing cases which
refused to enforce disclaimers, stated the position well:
Some [courts] have come closer to the heart of the matter by
finding some fundamental subject matter "of the contract"
which a disclaimer cannot in the circumstances be rightly con-
strued to undercut. [Citing cases] But in result, whatever the
rationale, such cases apply a rule of repugnancy to a disclaimer
or merger clause or to so much of it as runs counter to the
plain essence of the bargain.7 5
74. See text immediately following "(2) Causes of the Problem and Possible
Cures," p. 38 supra.
75. UNIFORMt REVISED SALES AcT § 37, Comment, at 145 (Proposed Final Draft No.
1, 1944). The approbation of the concept continued into the final version although it is
now sketchily expressed. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-313, Comments 1, 4, 6.
Some commentators have approved the essence doctrine. K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON
LAw TRADITION 368-69 (1960) [hereinafter cited as K. LLEWELLYN]; Ellinghouse, In
Defense of Uncondonability, 78 YALE L.J. 757, 796-800 (1969); Llewellyn, On, War-
ranty of Quality, and Society: II, 37 CoLum. L, REV. 341, 384-87 (1937). See also,
Comment, Limitations on Freedom to Modify Contract Remedies, 72 YALE L.J. 723
(1963).
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The essence doctrine, however, is either an unnecessarily abstract
way to phrase the policy of protecting bargains or it is tautological. As
far as the first point is concerned, essence is principally used to resolve
apparent conflicts between the promises a seller makes and the contract's
exculpatory clause. Now a seller cannot promise to bear R and not bear
R at the same time. A contract which contains language, or is sur-
rounded by circumstances, indicating that the seller will bear R, but which
contains an exculpatory clause which arguably shifts R to the buyer, must
be construed to see what the parties' intentions with respect to R in fact
were. For example, assume that a contract to sell oranges contains an
exculpatory clause which shifts all risks to the buyer, but the seller de-
livers apples. The parties may have intended the exculpatory clause to
refer only to risks which were likely to occur-that the oranges would
be rotten-and have also tacitly assumed that if the seller made such an
egregious and improbable mistake as to deliver apples, he would bear the
cost. A decisionmaker would thus be justified in not reading the excul-
patory clause as shifting the risk of delivery of a different product to the
buyer although it was literally applicable to that risk." The policy the
decision-maker would be pursuing is that of enforcing bargains. One
can also say, as some do, that the exculpatory clause ran counter to the
bargain's "essence" which was to deliver oranges; but if that phrase
means only that the seller's construction of the contract was not reason-
ably to be expected, one is using a confusing, meaningless, and therefore
unnecessary term.
This doctrine, however, may be more than another way of phrasing
76. A good many cases so hold. E.g., Foster v. Bradney, 143 Ark. 319, 220 S.W.
811 (1920) (used tractor delivered instead of new) ; W.F. Main & Co. v. Dearing, 73
Ark. 470, 84 S.W. 640 (1905) (cheap brassy jewelry not of kind the contract described) ;
Detwiler v. Downes, 119 Minn. 44, 137 N.W. 422 (1912) (cast iron pinions instead of
steel installed in a sawmill machine); Loveland v. Steenerson, 99 Minn. 14, 108 N.W.
831 (1906) ("wash plate" delivered instead of "rolled gold plate" jewelry) ; Smith v.
Oscar H. Will & Co., 51 N.D. 357, 199 N.W. 861 (1924) (sweet clover seed delivered
instead of Turkestan alfalfa) ; F. C. Austin Co. v. J.H. Tillman Co., 104 Ore. 541, 209
P. 131 (1922) (used machine delivered instead of new); Smeaton Hanscomb & Co.,
Ltd. v. Sassoon I. Setty, Son & Co. (No. 1), [1953] 1 W.L.R. 1468 (Q.B.) (dictum)
(pine logs delivered instead of mahogany) ; Karsales (Harrow), Ltd. v. Wallis, [1956]
1 W .L.R. 936 (C.A.) (used car delivered in radically and visibly worse condition than
when buyer inspected); Andrews Brothers (Bournemouth), Ltd. v. Singer & Company,
Ltd., [1934] 1 KB. 17 (C.A. 1933) (used car delivered instead of new). An alternative
resolution of the conflict between language describing the product and an exculpatory
clause is to read the seller's description as an opinion, which is particularly plausible
when there is a legitimate possibility of confusing the product with another. Seeds offer
the best example because it is difficult to distinguish between types. See Belt Seed Co.
v. Mitchelhill Seed Co., 236 Mo. App. 142, 153 S.W.2d 106 (K.C. Ct. App. 1941);
cf. Lumbrazo v. Woodruff, 256 N.Y. 92, 175 N.E. 525 (1931).
77. Professor Murray makes a similar criticism of the leading mutual mistake of
fact cases. Murray, supra note 61, at 13.
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the policy of protecting bargains. Its proponents seem at times to assert
that all sales contracts have an "essence" which allocates certain risks to
sellers, and that exculpatory clauses cannot be given effect because the
essence is unchangeable."8 In this form, the doctrine is tautological.
There is no need to define contracts as imposing an unalterable core of
risks on sellers. Courts could as well define them as authorizing the
parties to locate risks where they wish. The point, of course, is that the
way courts define contracts is determined by the aims they want to achieve.
Essence, for example, is thus occasionally put forward as the rationale
for preventing buyers from bearing what some conceive to be a dispro-
portionate share of risks."9 This goal, and others in which essence is used
as a rationalization, should be explicitly pursued. Tautologies only
obscure what courts or others want, and do not carry the reasoning for-
ward.
Unequal Bargaining Power
The unequal bargaining power concept has been used as the rationale
for striking contracts when the seller can determine the bargain's terms,
and those terms are considered "unreasonably favorable to the stronger
party.""0 Terms, however, can only be "unreasonably favorable" if they
make possible results which it is the policy of the state to avoid. Courts
should therefore be unconcerned with seller bargaining power, in this
area, because contractual clauses shifting risks of nonconformity to buyers
will not produce results inconsistent with those the courts seek. This is
especially true of the policy of protecting bargains. That policy is neutral
with respect to the outcome of those bargains; it requires a court only to
ascertain whether an informed buyer would be aware of the risk alloca-
tion, and if he would, the court should enforce it. This is as true for
buyer expectations that all risks are on them as that all risks are on sellers.
The argument that a seller's economic power may result in buyers bearing
more risks than they would had the parties been of equal strength does
not affect a policy that seeks only to give buyers what they could reasona-
bly believe they were getting.
Sales law, however, has often sought to use buyer expectations of
78. See K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 75, at 368-70.
79. Llewellyn thus remarked of his argument that sales contracts have an iron
essence: "The text attempts merely to present a technical argument which under the
language of the [Sales] Act itself can make a good deal of balancing of bargain entirely
respectable in law, for any court which feels like rolling up its sleeves." Id. at 387 n.l119.
80. E.g., Braucher, The Unconscionable Contract or Term, 31 U. PiTT. L. Rxv. 337,
341 (1970); Spanogle, Analyzing Unconscionability Problenzs, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 931,
944 (1969).
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risks as a weapon against powerful sellers. Llewellyn, in an influential
book review in which he discussed contracts of adhesion, suggested:
[W]here bargaining is absent in fact, the conditions and
clauses to be read into a bargain are not those which happen to
be printed on the unread paper, but are those which a sane man
might reasonably expect to find on that paper. The background
of trade practice gives a first indication. 81
However, a "sane man" dealing with a powerful seller might expect harsh
clauses, particulary if "trade practice" is to use them; and if such clauses
are actually unexpected, and therefore unenforced, strong sellers will only
make them visible because their buyers cannot easily refuse. Should
that be done, the policy of protecting bargains affords no. reason to strike
the clauses.8 2 Because this policy is neutral with respect to the outcome
of any given bargain which involves informed buyers and reasonably clear
exculpatory clauses, it must therefore also be neutral with respect to, seller
bargaining power, since that power only shapes bargains in certain ways.
A policy of avoiding concentrated losses should also be unaffected by
seller bargaining power because loss concentrations can be avoided
whether sellers have power or not. Assume that a seller with a monopoly
in electric lawn mowers shifts R to, informed buyers. If the buyers choose
not to gamble or incur avoidance costs, they can shift R to insurance com-
panies or back to the seller. The seller should accept the shift because even
monopolists will bear risks for a price. Moreover, the price a monopolist
will charge for R will probably be competitive since a product monopoly
seldom carries with it monopolistic control over bearing the risks associ-
ated with that product. This is obviously true for the risks of personal in-
jury or property damage-control over lawn mowers cannot bring with it
81. Llewellyn, Book Review, 52 HARV. L. REv. 700, 704 (1939). See also Kessler.
Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 CoLum. L. REv.
629, 637 (1943).
82. The Supreme Court, though, recently adopted a version of Llewellyn's argu-
ment, when it declared unconstitutional state statutes which authorized sellers to replevy
goods before final judgment and without a hearing, although the sales contracts author-
ized such repossessions. The Court stated:
There was no bargaining power over contract terms between the parties who, in
any event, were far from equal in bargaining power. The purported waiver pro-
vision was a printed part of a form sales contract and a necessary condition of
the sale. The appellees made no showing whatever that the appellants were
actually aware or made aware of the significance of the fine print now relied up-
on as a waiver of constitutional rights.
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 95 (1972). If, however, the repossession clauses were in
fact "a necessary condition of the sale," the buyers would probably have taken them if
they were visible; and after this case, such clauses will be both visible and, if the only
applicable policy is to protect bargains, enforceable.
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control over the insurance market against these risks. In a different con-
text, the number of independent auto repair shops illustrates the dif-
ficulty of getting control over a repair market even when one has some
control over the product. Finally, even if sellers will bear the repair risk
only at a monopolistic price, there will still be no loss concentrations
because the price will have been taken into account before purchase. That
is to say, if buyers have information, they will value the repair risk at the
seller's rates, and if it is not too high to preclude purchase, they will ex-
pend the money on repairs when necessary, or pay the seller in ad-
vance to make them. A policy which seeks to avoid loss concentrations,
in sum, is unconcerned with seller bargaining power because buyers can
shift losses regardless of how much power sellers have.
I have also shown that, information problems aside, competitive
markets reach optimality without the state's aid. Monopolistic markets,
where sellers have unequal bargaining power, misallocate resources by
producing less than buyers want. Nevertheless, monopolists react sim-
ilarly to competitors where allocations of risks of nonconformity are con-
cerned. We should therefore have little interest in the location of these
risks in the monopoly case; and consequently should be unconcerned
with the unequal bargaining power phenomenon, of which monopoly is
the paradigm.
Assume that A(b) and A(s) are both greater than R. Monopo-
lists, roughly speaking, price just below the prices of substitutes. If, there-
fore, buyers will pay up to, but no more than, $30 for a product and R is
$5, a monopolist who disclaims will charge $25. Banning the disclaimer
will cause a price increase to $30. An informed buyer's cost perceptions
will be unchanged, however; and so will output. Nor will the seller be
induced to make the product differently as a result of the ban.
Output will also be unaffected by banning disclaimers when either
or both parties have avoidance costs lower than R, because monopolistic
sellers will bear those risks they can more cheaply avoid.83 If their costs
can be lowered, price can also be lowered without affecting unit profit;
and it is then in a monopolist's interest to lower price, for this increases
output and total profits. To use the example above, if A(s) is $2 and
A(b) $4, a monopolist will already be bearing R because this enables a
price of $28 per unit rather than $30, without affecting unit profit; and
83. A monopolist restricts output because price is inversely related to supply, and
the price decreases which output increases bring will be borne only by him, since he
produces the entire supply. See G. STIGGlER, THE THEORY OF PRICE 197-99 (1966). Out-
put, and in consequence price, is thus set at the point where, given the demand and costs,
profits will be maximized.
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a price of $28 is plainly preferable to the seller since that yields more sales
and higher total profits. In monopolistic markets, therefore, bargains will
also produce the preferred level of defective goods. A policy which seeks
to improve product quality through allocations of risks of nonconformity
should then be unconcerned with the seller's economic power, since that
power has no bearing on the policy's aim.
The effectiveness of judicial policies in connection with defective
products thus does not require equal bargaining power of sellers and
buyers. To be sure, if buyers are uninformed, enforcing the bargains they
agree to is unwise, and the ability of the market to avoid loss concen-
trations and improve product quality will be adversely affected. This,
however, is not a critizism of the analysis, but is its point-i.e., the state
should not be concerned with bargaining power but with the information
problem.
It is a commonplace, however, that courts are quite concerned over
seller bargaining power, and the cases often refuse to enforce exculpatory
clauses on the ground that the buyers had no choice but to submit. The
famous case of Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors4 is only one example.
To the extent that these cases equate unequal bargaining power with a
lack of information-that the buyer lacks power because he lacks knowl-
edge-they are unexceptional. When buyers lack knowledge, the state
may provide information or impose risks, but judges can only impose
risks.s  The decisions, however, seem also to aim at the phenomenon of
market power. This, as the foregoing shows, is wrong since the seller's
market power impedes none of the aims that judges themselves wish to
realize. 6
84. 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
85. It is another question whether courts have the institutional competence to iden-
tify information gaps accurately. I doubt they can do this well, cf. discussion of Wilson
Trading beginning at note 30 supra, but with no one else doing it at all it is difficult to
criticize them for trying.
86. I have in mind cases such as Sarfati v. M.A. Hittner & Sons, Inc., 35 App.
Div. 2d 1004, 318 N.Y.S.2d 352 (1970), in which an automobile lessor which was held
liable for personal injuries incurred by a lessee was allowed to recover against the
manufacturer in spite of a disclaimer because, inter alia:
The lessor herein, Hittner, is in no better commercial position than the con-
sumer. It is in no position to alter the warranty or negotiate for better pro-
tection and, consequently, American's disclaimer of warranty is equally un-
conscionable as to the lessor of the vehicle (see Henningsen v. Bloomfield Mo-
tors, 32 N.J. 358).
Id. at 1005, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 354. See also Ford Motor Co. v. Tritt, 244 Ark. 883, 430
S.W.2d 778 (1968) (dealer allowed to recover against Ford despite disclaimer). If
these buyers were informed as to risk and avoidance costs, which seems likely, cases such
as these are pointless.
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Vertical Privily"1
The question is whether an end user (B), who concededly can sue
his own seller (S2) for product defects, should also be allowed to sue the
one who sold to his seller, or the one who sold to that seller, and so forth
(the remote sellers are called Si). Assume that B is informed. The
policy of protecting bargains implies that whether B can sue S1 depends
on whether S1 engendered in him expectations that S1 would bear R. If
so, the suit should be allowed. This policy therefore provides no simple
answers, but rather demands a case by case determination."
The goal of improving product quality does not require imposing
R on S1. B and S2 will allocate risks among themselves in the most ef-
ficient way; that is to say, the party whose avoidance costs are lower will
bear R. If S1 has lower avoidance costs than either of them, he will bear
R. For example, assume R is $5, A(b) is $6, A(S2) is $4 and A(S1) is
87. The horizontal privity question, whether one who is a stranger to the transac-
tion may sue one or more of the parties to it for injuries suffered as a result of defects,
seems now for the most part correctly being answered in favor of allowing the suit.
UNIFORM CommERCiAL CODE § 2-318, Alternative A, authorizes actions against retailers
by members of the buyer's family or household and guests in his home. Employees and
bystanders have been permitted to recover as well. See Delta Oxygen Co. v. Scott,
238 Ark. 534, 383 S.W.2d 885 (1964) (employee) ; Elmore v. Am. Motors Corp., 70
Cal. 2d 578, 451 P.2d 84, 73 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1964) (bystander) ; Heckel v. Am. Coupling
Corp., 384 Mich. 19, 179 N.W.2d 381 (1970) (employee); Piercefield v. Remington
Arms Co., 375 Mich. 85, 133 N.W.2d 129 (1965) (bystander); Murray v. Bullard
Co., 110 N.H. 220, 265 A.2d 309 (1970) (employee) ; see Comment, Strict Products Li-
ability to the Bystander: A Study in Common Law Determinism, 38 U. CHI. L. REv. 625
(1971) ; Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L.
REv. 791 (1966). The bystander cases seem unexceptional, but the employee cases are
troublesome: strangers should win because they constitute unorganized groups; thus
they are unable to negotiate in advance with parties to the bargain to shift risks to those
parties, or to be themselves paid for bearing risks. Certain costs of defects will therefore
be externalized from the buyer/seller transaction, and sellers will have no incentive to
reduce them. Employees, however, may bargain with their employer respecting these
risks before any accident occurs, particularly if they are unionized; the costs of defects
can therefore be internalized. Employees, moreover, will not bear all losses attributable
to an accident because of the availability of workman's compensation, which renders the
goal of avoiding loss concentrations partly inapplicable. The cases nevertheless are now
treating all third parties alike.
88. The cases sometimes allow consumers to sue manufacturers because the manu-
facturer's advertising was directed to the general public. E.g., Garthwait v. Burgio, 153
Conn. 284, 216 A.2d 189 (1965); Inglis v. Am. Motors Corp., 3 Ohio St. 2d 132, 209
N.E.2d 583 (1965). See also Kessler, Products Liability, 76 YALE L.J. 887, 892-93
(1967). Such cases are often badly reasoned, however, because manufacturer assur-
ances that quality is high are consistent with an intention that consumers or retailers
bear the risk that quality is in fact low, and such assurances may at times be so under-
stood. A new car buyer, for example, may have been swayed by national ads to choose
a brand, but may also have selected the dealer because of the service he will render since
it is often understood that only dealers provide redress when things go wrong. The text
thus argues that consumers should be allowed to sue manufacturers only if they can
reasonably expect manufacturers to bear risks.
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$2. B and S2 will agree such that R is on S2; S2 and S1 will agree such
that R is on S1. If, moreover, A (b) were $4 and A(s2) were $6, but
A(sl) were $2, S1 would still bear risks. In this case, S1 will induce
S2 to bear R in the B-S2 bargain, and then shift it to Si, since this will
produce the lowest price. The effect on output and quality will be optimal
without the law's aid, and there is thus no need to impose R on S1.
The policy of avoiding loss concentrations is, with an exception to
be noted, also satisfied if B is limited to actions against S2. Since an in-
formed buyer can shift R to insurance companies or S2, there is no need
to impose risks on S1. The exception is that if B shifts risks to S2, and
S2 becomes bankrupt before he is called on to pay, the loss will then be
concentrated on B. It is often said that R should be imposed on S1 to
avoid this "bankruptcy risk," for if B has a choice of defendants, both are
unlikely to be broke at once. This is not a conclusion which follows
logically from the premise, for if B's "insurance company" goes bankrupt
S1 is no more a logical secondary insurer than the nearest bank or rich
man. It may be argued that SI will be better able to predict liability than
strangers to the product, and that it is thus fairer to burden him. Such
predictions can best be made, however, if R is imposed on S1 before the
fact. If that is done, however, the law will create the anomalous, and
absurd, situation of allowing B and S2, both of whom are fully informed,
to bargain freely over R, while imposing IR on Si, for the sole reason that
B may shift R to S2 and S2 may later go bankrupt."0 The logical absurdity
can be avoided by also imposing R on S2; but the fact that a retailer may
go bankrupt seems hardly sufficient to justify an across the board
abandonment of bargains. It seems plainly preferable to have B bear the
bankruptcy risk, at least unless it is likely to be large, and recent evidence
indicates this will not be so."
89. A solution less disruptive than imposing risks on S1 in all cases would be to
impose them only when S2 is judgment proof; thus, B would have to prove as part of
his affirmative case against Si that S2 could not respond in damages. This solution
seems seldom to have been suggested, perhaps because it appears an unprincipled or ex-
cessively blatant application of the deep pocket theory. More telling objections are, as
indicated above, that S1 may be unable to predict his dealers' bankruptcies with any
certainty, and that such a rule would strengthen Sl's desire to deal only with financially
stable people, thereby making it difficult for small retailers to function. These objec-
tions lose some force, however, when it is realized that the bankruptcy risk is slight.
See note 90 infra. Nevertheless, because of them, and other reasons the text indicates,
I prefer leaving the bankruptcy risk on B: but the solution of making S1 liable only
when S2 cannot pay is plainly more satisfactory than making S1 always liable.
90. In fact, the risk is probably slight. In 1967, for example, there were
2,047,000 retail trade outlets, and 5,696 retail bankruptcies, a percentage of .003; in 1968,
there were 2,113,000 retail trade outlets, and 4,366 retail bankruptcies, a percentage of
.002; in 1969 there were 2,191,000 retail trade outlets and 4,070 retail bankruptcies, a
percentage of .002. DuNq & BRADsTIRET, THE FAImR RATE THROUGH 1968, 8-9
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Other reasons argue for the same result. Sellers bargain with
buyers over repairs, replacements, refunds and so forth. Often, it may
be more efficient for them to deal only with immediate vendees, whose
number and characteristics are easily known, than for them to deal with
subusers. If the law insulates S1 from B, S1 can deal only with his own
vendees when that would be efficient. And when it would be more
efficient to deal with subusers as well, S1 is free to do so. On the other
hand, if the law allowed B to recover from S1, S1 would be compelled
to deal with any end user who raised a claim. Therefore, allowing B to
sue S1 (i.e., abolishing vertical privity barriers) may yield less efficient
dispute resolution systems. The logical and policy difficulties involved
in imposing R on S1 in all cases, together with the slightness of the
bankruptcy risk and the possible gains from limiting B to S2, all suggest
that the goal of avoiding concentrated losses affords insufficient reason
to eliminate vertical privity barriers. When, in sum, B is informed,
privity should be retained, except in those cases when S1 agrees to bear
R.
9 1
When B is uninformed, the state can provide information, in which
case the resolution of the vertical privity question is of course unchanged.
If, however, the choice is to impose risks, and thus abandon the policy
of protecting bargains, the privity issue is whether to impose them only on
S2, or also on S1. The goal of improving product quality is neutral. If
R is imposed on S1 and/or S2, they will still allocate it optimally between
them. Likewise, the goal of avoiding loss concentrations is analyzed in
the same way whether B is informed or not, with one exception. If a legis-
lature decides to impose risks, it might initially impose them on S2, and
(1969). 1970 DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF
THE UNITED STATES 468; 1971 id. 459; BUSINESS STATISTICS, 18TH BIENNIAL EDITION:
A SUPPLEMENT TO THE SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS 38 (1971); DEP'T OF TREASURY,
INTERNATIONAL REVENUE STATISTICS OF INCOME (1969). The percentage of buyers who
have uncompensated product claims against bankrupt retailers is unlikely to be much
higher than this. Little is therefore lost by limiting B to S2 in all cases.
91. A common argument for abolishing vertical privity barriers is that this will
avoid circuity of actions, wherein the retailer who is initially sued will have to sue his
seller and so forth. E.g., Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305
(1965) ; PROSSER, supra note 1, § 97, at 650-51. The argument, however, is fallacious.
In the text's hypothetical, if B is limited to an action against S2, whether there will be
one or two law suits depends not on the law but on whether S1 shifted R to S2 by a
disclaimer; if so, S2 will bear the loss alone. If, on the other hand, B is allowed to
sue S1, whether there will be one law suit or two depends not on the law but on whether
Si shifted R to S2 by means of an indemnification clause; if so, there will be two actions,
B v. 51 and Si v. S2. Such clauses, it has been suggested, will become more common as
privity barriers are abolished. 3 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY §
44.01[2] (1970). The number of actions there will be, in sum, is independent of privity
rules; it depends, rather, on how the commercial parties allocate risks among themselves.
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there will therefore be no absurdity in imposing R on Si while allowing
S2 to disclaim. Nevertheless, the slightness of the bankruptcy risk to-
gether with the gains in efficiency from insulating S1 still suggest the
desirability of retaining privity barriers.
Vertical privity barriers should therefore be retained whether buyers
are informed or not.92 But as everyone knows the courts have largely
dismantled them. This of course has yielded small gains, but it is not
especially troublesome. The principal loss has been to make some dispute
resolution systems more expensive, and intuition indicates that that is
unlikely to be a very large loss. If, however, we decide to deal in a
thorough way with the question of allocating the risks of defective pro-
ducts, the vertical privity question should be reconsidered.
III. RISKS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
Warranty law for many years was primarily responsible for allocat-
ing risks of nonconformity between the parties to sales. Recently, it has
shared its role with the law of tort, particularly in cases of personal in-
jury, 3 but its field of exclusive operation remains large, and a substantial
number of personal injury cases are still resolved by it. Warranty law is
currently codified in the Uniform Commercial Code. The significance of
that statute justifies an analysis of its response to the problems which de-
fective products pose.
92. The text's argument, it should be emphasized, is that the two principal reasons
for abolishing vertical privity barriers, to avoid concentrated losses and to put the risk
on the party presumably best able to avoid it, are satisfied even for uninformed buyers
if R is on S2, the retailer. The text's point, however, can be turned around, by saying
that these goals can also be satisfied by imposing R on S1 because when S1 and S2
bargain, who initially bears the loss is irrelevant; imposing R on both sellers, moreover,
reduces the bankruptcy risk. To this I reply that the bankruptcy risk is small, and that
there is a cost to imposing R on S1 in yielding less efficient dispute resolution systems.
It may be argued, however, that S1 can pay S2 to deal with B when that would be more
efficient, and thus abolishing privity would do S1 no harm; but there seem to be great
practical difficulties in shunting B to S2 when B prefers to proceed against S1 and has
the legal right to do so. S1, in sum, will likely have to deal with B, and that may cost
more than it is worth.
Finally, it has often been argued that S1 should be liable because he put the article
on the market, and thus "caused" the accident, or that his putting the article on the
market entailed an implicit representation of safety. The first argument is meaning-
less because it is as easy and irrefutable to say that the accident was "caused" by the
purchase. The second argument rests on an empirical premise, that buyers rely on a
representation of safety and expect manufacturers to pay when the product fails, which
is contradicted by the only studies done. See authorities cited note 68 supra. Of greater
significance, the point seems insincerely made because if a representation supports li-
ability, manufacturers should be allowed to, and in their contracts do, counteract it; but
the usual practice is to recite there is a representation and pass over disclaimers.
93. See, e.g., Cunningham v. MacNeal Memorial Hospital, 47 Ill. 2d 443, 266
N.E.2d 897 (1971) (applying the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 402A (1966) to
the sale of "bad blood").
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The Code creates two warranties, express and implied. Under the
first, if a seller asserts that the product has a particular trait, e.g., it has
four cylinders, he bears the risk of any loss caused by the absence of that
trait, provided that his assertion was "part of the basis of the bargain.""
A seller who asserts nothing thus makes no express warranties. If a seller
makes assertions about the product, but wishes not to bear risks, he can
disclaim.95 Section 2-316(1) directs the courts to harmonize words which
suggest the seller will bear risks with words that he will not, but if the
two sets of statements cannot reasonably be read together, "negation or
limitation [of the warranty] is inoperative.
Implied warranties are of two kinds. First, if the seller ordinarily
vends the goods in question, he necessarily bears practically all risks of
nonconformity. The statutory phraseology is that the seller makes a
warranty of "merchantability," and that goods, "to be merchantable,"
must, inter alia, "pass without objection in the trade under the contract
description" and be "fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods
are used. . . ."" Sellers who prefer not to bear these risks may dis-
claim. Section 2-316(2) requires such disclaimers, if in writing, to "men-
tion merchantability" and to "be conspicuous.""8 If the seller fails to do
these things, he may shift risks to. buyers in other ways, for § 2-316(2)
is made subject to § 2-316(3), and that subsection allows the warranty
to be excluded by phrases such as "as is" or "with all faults" or other
language which in "common understanding calls the buyer's attention to
the exclusion of warranties and makes plain that there is no implied
warranty. .
Finally, buyers may use products for "particular purposes" which
sellers ordinarily cannot anticipate. If, however, the seller "has reason to
know" the buyer's purpose, and to know that the buyer is "relying on" his
"skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods," the seller bears the
risk that the goods will not suit the use to which they will be put; he has
made an implied warranty of fitness for a "particular purpose."'00 Sellers
94. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-313(1).
95. Id. § 2-316.
96. The full subsection reads:
Words or conduct relevant to the creation of an express warranty and words
or conduct tending to negate or limit warranty shall be construed wherever
reasonable as consistent with each other; but subject to the provisions of this
Article on parol or extrinsic evidence (Section 2-202) negation or limitation is
inoperative to the extent that such construction is unreasonable.
Id. § 2-316(1).
97. Id. §§ 2-314(1), (2) (a), (2) (c).
98. Id. § 2-316(2).
99. Id. § 2-316(3) (a).
100. Id. § 2-315.
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who desire not to make this warranty can dispel buyer reliance, by, inter
alia, disclaiming; and § 2-316(2) authorizes disclaimers of the fitness
warranty if they are in writing "and conspicuous."''
Even if a seller makes an express warranty or fails to disclaim an
implied one, he need not bear all risks associated with noncompliance.
Section 2-719(1) authorizes sellers to limit the remedies arising from
warranty breaches to the "return of the goods and repayment of the
"'11,price. . . . H owever, if such a limitation, in the "circumstances . . .
fail [s] of its essential purpose . . ," the buyer may pursue all remedies,
which means that the seller bears all risks.0 3 In addition, while a seller
may refuse to bear consequential damages, such refusals are only given
effect when not "unconscionable."' 4 Finally, § 2-302 authorizes courts
to strike any "unconscionable" contract, or contract clause; 5 and despite
scholarly criticism, it has been held that a disclaimer of warranties which
satisfies the requirements of § 2-316(2) may be given no effect if it
is unconscionable. 00
The most striking thing about this statutory scheme is its irresolu-
tion. The Code apparently pursues only the goal of protecting bargains,
for it seems to impose no risks on sellers, who are left free to make no
express warranties and to disclaim all implied ones. However, the text
permits courts to impose risks on sellers if they perceive exculpatory
clauses to be unconscionable, and some have done so. Moreover, whether
warranties have been made or disclaimed is largely at the courts' discre-
tion. The making of an express warranty turns initially on whether any
seller assertions were "part of the basis of the bargain,"'07 but courts are
left to find, or define, that bargain, and it may also turn on whether
phrases of assertion are "reasonably" consistent with words shifting
risks to buyers.' Whether implied warranties are successfully disclaimed
turns largely on whether language of disclaimer was "conspicuous,"'09
101. Id. § 2-316(2).
102. Id. § 2-719(1).
103. Id. §2-719(2).
104. Id. § 2-719(3).
105. Id. §2-302.
106. See authorities cited note 45 supra. The principal critic of this result is Pro-
fessor Leff, who argues that when the draftsmen explicitly regulated the manner in
which warranties can be disclaimed, it is unreasonable to impute to them the intention
to allow disclaimers proper in form to be struck down by use of § 2-302. Leff, Uncon-
scionability and the Code-The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. Rxv. 485, 523-24
(1967) [hereinafter cited as Leff].
107. UNIFORM Com:CstmaiA CODE § 2-313(1) (a).
108. Id. §2-316(1).
109. Id. § 2-316(2).
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an inquiry susceptible of varying answers ;11o and it may also turn, under
§ 2-316(3) (a), on whether the seller's language "in common under-
standing" would communicate the absence of warranties."1 Moreover,
if sellers do make warranties, but attempt to shift risks to buyers by
limiting remedies, courts are authorized to strike such clauses if they
"fail" of their "essential purpose" or are unconscionable. These standards
have no intrinsic meaning, but must be given content as the occasion
arises."'
Statutes cannot help but delegate much to those who enforce them.
But unless that delegation is informed by decisions on the basic policies,
its effect is to, shift the problem to another forum. The Code is irresolute
because such decisions seem not to have been made, or, if made, were as-
suredly not disclosed. The text itself communicates only that risks of
nonconformity will ordinarily be on sellers unless sellers shift them to
buyers, but that such shifts can be held ineffective if the courts for reasons
satisfactory to them so decide. The comments, as a brief analysis of them
indicates, communicate little more.
Comment 4 to § 2-313, for example, after criticizing disclaimers,1
110. See text accompanying notes 45-60 supra.
111. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-316(3) (a). As an illustration of the open-
endedness of § 2-316(3) (a), compare First Nat'l Bank v. Husted, 57 Ill. App. 2d 227,
205 N.E.2d 780 (1965) (used car: words "in its present condition" disclaim implied
warranties) withl Hull-Dobbs, Inc. v. Mallicoat, 57 Tenn. App. 100, 415 S.W.2d 344
(1966) (used car: words "in its present condition" do not disclaim implied warranties).
112. As to the lack of direction the phrase "unconscionable" provides see Leff,
supra note 106. UNIFoRM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-719(2) authorizes courts to strike a
remedy limitation which "circumstances" have caused "to fail of its essential purpose."
But since the purpose of a remedy limitation is to limit remedies, one can fail only if
the courts will not enforce it, which means that § 2-719(2) authorizes nothing at all.
The comments attempt to supplement the text by reciting that the section enables courts
to strike a clause which "because of circumstances fails in its purpose or operates to
deprive either party of the substantial value of the bargain. . . ." Id., Comment 1 (em-
phasis added). The phrase before "or" says nothing; the phrase after says scarcely
more. If the contract contained a remedy limitation, the "bargain" was that the buyer's
remedies were limited; when, therefore, a loss occurs and the seller asserts that the con-
tract requires the buyer to bear it, giving credit to the assertion cannot deprive the
buyer of the "substantial value of the bargain," for his bargain was to bear that loss.
Again, the only way a party can be deprived of the substantial value of the bargain
would be for the court to refuse to enforce the contract, thereby depriving the seller
of the bargained for limitation. Section 2-719(2), in sum, is meaningless as written,
and in consequence has been taken by courts as a carte blanch. See, e.g., Wilson Trad-
ing Corp. v. David Ferguson, Ltd., 23 N.Y.2d 398, 244 N.E.2d 685, 297 N.Y.S.2d 108
(1968).
113. The language which precedes that to be quoted above recites:
In view of the principle that the whole purpose of the law of warranty is
to determine what it is that the seller has in essence agreed to sell, the policy is
adopted of those cases which refuse except in unusual circumstances to recognize
a material deletion of the seller's obligation. Thus a contract is normally a con-
tract for a sale of something describable and described. A clause generally
disclaiming 'all warranties express or implied' cannot reduce the seller's obliga-
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states: "This is not intended to mean that the parties, if they consciously
desire, cannot make their own bargain as they wish.""' 4 This implies that
the Code will enforce the parties' risk allocations, which in my termino-
logy means that the Code is pursuing a policy of protecting bargains.
Comment 1 to § 2-719, however, asserts that
[I] t is of the very essence of a sales contract that at least min-
imum adequate remedies be available. If the parties intend to
conclude a contract for sale within this Article they must accept
the legal consequence that there be at least a fair quantum of
remedy for breach of the obligations or duties outlined in the
contract." 5
Since all contracts for the sale of goods must fall "within" the Co de's
jurisdiction," and since it is possible for buyers to agree that sellers will
attempt to supply products of good quality, but pay little or nothing if
they fail, this comment suggests that policies other than protecting bar-
gains are operative. Moreover, comment 1 to § 2-302 states that the
"principle" underlying unconscionability "is one of the prevention of op-
pression and unfair surprise. .... ,"11 This implies that a contract may be
oppressive but not surprising, and thus also. suggests that policies other
than freedom of contract are at work. Finally, § 2-318 "extends" the
benefit of any warranties a seller makes to his buyer "to any natural per-
son who is a guest in his home" if the seller could reasonably expect that
tion with respect to such description and therefore cannot be given literal effect
under Section 2-316.
UNIFORM Co ,RclA. CODE § 2-313, Comment 4. It is difficult to know what this
means. If the "whole purpose" is to discover the seller's agreement, there should be no
disapproval of disclaimers because they only indicate that the seller "agreed to sell"
little. If, on the other hand, the comment suggests that courts look to the contract apart
from the disclaimer to see what the agreement was, and then frown on the disclaimer when
it constitutes "a material deletion of the seller's obligation," it asks courts to look not
at any agreement in the normal sense of the word, but at an artificial construct, an
"agreement" minus key terms. Something like this is only advocated for policy reasons,
but the policy is undisclosed. The quote, however, may be no more than an argument
against allowing sellers easily to shift the risk of delivery of a different kind of product
to buyers, see note 76 supra & text accompanying, although if this is what was meant, it
was said unusually obliquely. In any event, the draftsmen, as this and other comments
indicate, plainly frowned on disclaimers but did not say why.
114. UNIFORM CoammEcmx. CODP § 2-313, Comment 4.
115. Id. § 2-719, Comment 1 (emphasis added).
116. Article 2 of the Code applies to "transactions in goods," Id. § 2-102, with goods
defined as
all things . . . movable at the time of identification to the contract for sale
other than the money in which the price is to be paid, investment securities . . .
and things in action.
Id. § 2-105(1).
117. Id. § 2-302, Comment 1.
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person to "use, consume or be affected by the goods" and he "is injured in
person by breach of the warranty.""'  Guests and relatives, however, can
seldom reasonably expect sellers to bear the risk of their injuries because
they have not dealt with those sellers and thus have no basis on which to
conclude that the sellers will compensate them. Plaintiffs such as these
can recover only because the Code is also pursuing the policies of avoiding
concentrated losses and improving product quality. But if that is so, the
Code's decision to allow sellers to prevent recovery by these plaintiffs by
disclaiming to their buyers" 9 appears irrational. For just as guests do not
win because the seller communicates to them an intention to bear risks,
they should not lose when the seller communicates to others an intention
not to bear risks. The comments to § 2-318, however, fail to discuss this
problem. Indeed, neither they nor the comments to any other warranty
section mention the policies of preventing loss concentrations or improv-
ing product quality, nor do they disclose their implications or relate them
to the goal of letting the parties "make their own bargain as they
wish."' 20
The principal criticism of the Code's decisions with respect to allocat-
ing risks of nonconformity, therefore, is that there seem to have been no
decisions. The matter is left to the courts, to impose risks or protect
bargains, without statutory guidance, The Code's most serious specific
omission was not treating the information problem. The central task of
a body of law which allocates risks of nonconformity is to decide which
buyers have information and which lack it, and to resolve the problems
caused by information gaps. This is a task the Code fails to address.
It does not classify buyers into those who are informed and those who are
ignorant; it neither provides buyers with information as to risk and
avoidance costs nor creates a mechanism whereby such information can
be provided; it does not itself impose risks, as the alternative to providing
information, on the sellers of uninformed buyers; it fails to instruct the
courts to make such impositions; and it resolves none of the value choices
which a lack of information poses.
The result of this failure is to thrust courts into an area in which they
must inevitably perform badly. Courts lack the institutional competence
to provide information and to police it. They can instead only impose
118. Id. § 2-318, Alternative A.
119. Comment 1 to § 2-318 explains:
To the extent that the contract of sale contains provisions under which war-
ranties are excluded or modified, or remedies for breach limited, such provi-
sions are equally operative against beneficiaries of warranties under this section.
Id. § 2-318, Comment 1.
120. Id. § 2-313, Comment 4.
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risks, which is the second best solution. Moreover, it is at times difficult
to know when this should be done. A serious stereo buff, for example,
may be sufficiently informed to bargain competently, while a small busi-
ness purchasing a truck may not be; gross classifications, such as con-
sumer/businessman, will thus often be wrong. The records sales law
suits ordinarily yield, however, may often be insufficient to enable more
accurate classifications to be made. And this defect is exacerbated by the
Code's failure to focus the question to be decided-whether to impose
risks-on the presence or absence of information, which reduces the
parties' incentive to litigate the information issue fully. Finally, whatever
the courts do, we have seen, will often be done in surreptitious and con-
fusing ways. 1'
Dissatisfaction with judicial performance in warranty cases, more-
over, has long been expressed, and encroachments on that performance
are increasingly being made. Indeed, an important reason for creating the
Code was the courts' poor treatment of warranty cases under the Uniform
Sales Act.'22 Today, several states have significantly limited the power
the Code gives sellers to disclaim ;123 courts often ignore the statute when
deciding cases ;124 and Congress has been threatening to federalize this
area of the law.'25 Allowing the courts to work entirely on their own,
121. The Code's failures are a major cause of the courts' refusal to enforce
bargains neutrally. The section entitled "The Problem of Neutrally Enforcing Bar-
gains," supra, dealing with this problem, may thus be read as a footnote to this more spe-
cific statutory analysis.
122. E.g., Llewellyn, The Needed Federal Sales Act, 26 VA. L. REv. 558 (1940).
123. Maryland and Massachusetts amended the Code to abolish disclaimers in con-
sumer sales, California severely limited a seller's ability to disclaim to consumers, and
all three jurisdictions also make the enforceability of manufacturers' clauses limiting
their obligation to the repair or replacement of defective parts of their products turn on
the manufacturers' maintenance of facilities which will enable them reasonably to con-
ply therewith. CAL. Civ. CODE §§ 1791-93 (West 1973) ; MD. ANN. CODE art. 95B, § 2-
316A (1971), amending MD. ANN. CODE art. 95B, § 2-316A (1964) ; MAss. ANN. LAws
ch. 106, § 2-316A (Supp. 1972), amending MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 106, § 316 (1963).
124. One example of this is the tendency to look to tort law when consumers are
injured by defective products. E.g., Clary v. Fifth Avenue Chrysler Center, Inc., 454
P.2d 244 (Alas. 1969) ; Wachtel v. Rosol, 159 Conn. 496, 271 A.2d 84 (1970) ; McGrath
v. White Motor Corp., 92 Ore. Adv. 777, 484 P.2d 838 (1971) ; see Franklin, supra note
28; Titus, supra note 5. Courts also sometimes questionably construe the Code to give
buyers more aid than warranty traditionally provides, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Pittman,
227 So. 2d 246 (Dist. Ct. App., Fla. 1969), cert. denied, 237 So. 2d 177 (Fla. 1970) (re-
fusing to enforce disclaimer), or simply ignore it, preferring judicial authority. E.g.,
Hochberg v. O'Donnell's Restaurant, Inc., 272 A.2d 846 (D.C. Ct. App. 1971); Web-
ster v. Blue Ship Tea Room, Inc., 347 Mass. 421, 198 N.E.2d 309 (1964) ; Wernick v.
Bob Ware's Food Shops, Inc., 27 Mass. App. Dec. 19 (1963) ; Hunt v. Ferguson-Paulus
Enterprises, Inc., 243 Ore. 546, 415 P.2d 13 (1966).
125. The Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement
Act, S. 356, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), which has passed the Senate three times, would
increase the disclosure sellers must make to consumers in respect of exculpatory clauses
and curtail their ability to disclaim. For an analysis of S. 356 by its sponsor see Mag-
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
which is the Code's solution, is an inadequate response to the problems
defective products pose.
CONCLUSION
The three goals which courts have pursued in connection with risks
of nonconformity are to protect bargains in respect of the location of these
risks, to avoid concentrated losses should defects occur, and to improve
the quality of products. These policies are complementary, if
buyers are informed as to risk and avoidance costs, because when it will
be in the interest of buyers to choose risk allocations which avoid loss
concentrations, and to choose against risky products if substitutes exist,
they will probably do so. Conversely, when buyers lack information as
to risk and avoidance costs there will probably be few gains, and serious
losses, from pursuing these policies. The central task, therefore, is to
ascertain and cure information gaps. The preferable cure is to provide
buyers with information, and allow them to bargain as regards risk al-
locations. This not only will maximize private choice, but will enable the
courts' other goals to be realized more satisfactorily than if risks are im-
posed on the sellers of uninformed buyers. But imposing risks on such
sellers is still preferable to allowing the parties to bargain in ignorance.
The state, however, has never identified information gaps in a systematic
way; it has provided buyers with almost no information; and it has failed
to impose risks in an intellectually coherent manner. There is therefore
much to do, if private ordering is to make a substantial contribution
toward resolving the problem of defective products.
nuson, Federal Developments in Product Warranty Law, 4 U.C.C.L.J. 279 (1972).
See also AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, CONSUMER WARRANTY PROPOSALS AND FTC
AMENDMENTS (1971) (Legislative Analysis No. 14). This Act, however, aims too low.
Its major object is to ensure that consumer buyers know when they are bearing risks of
nonconformity. An uninformed buyer who knows only that, knows too little, for he re-
mains ignorant of R, A (b) and the range and frequency of X. Should this Act pass,
buyers will be as unable to make rational decisions about bearing, avoiding or shifting
risks as they are now. Congress would be better advised either to ban exculpatory
clauses in markets where uninformed buyers operate or preferably to address the infor-
mation problem directly.
